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Abstract
We study price competition between rms over public list or posted prices when a fraction of
consumers (termed `bargainers') can subsequently receive discounts with some probability. Such
stochastic discounts are a feature of markets in which some consumers bargain explicitly and
of markets in which sellers use the marketing practice of couponing. Even though bargainers
receive reductions o the posted prices, the potential to discount dampens competitive pressure
in the market, thus raising all prices and increasing prots. Welfare falls because of the stochastic
nature of the discounts, which generates some misallocation of products to consumers. We also
nd that stochastic discounts facilitate collusion by reducing the market share that can be gained
from a deviation.
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1 Introduction
Firms often oer discounts o public list or posted prices. For example, Busse et al. (2006)
document the widespread use of price discounts against xed list prices by car dealerships in
California, while Goldberg (1996), Scott Morton et al. (2011) and the United Kingdom's Com-
petition Commission (2000, Appendix 7.1) document that discounts in the private automobile
market vary signicantly across consumers, with some consumers receiving no discount at all o
the list price. A similar pattern holds for discounts o estate agent (realtor) fees in the United
Kingdom: the Oce of Fair Trading (2004, Section 4.48) found that almost 50% of house sell-
ers using an estate agent had tried to negotiate fees, with 80% of those receiving a reduction.
Public commentators often refer to evidence of bargaining o the list price in retail stores such
as jewellers, shoe shops, travel agents, furniture stores and electrical retailers (see, e.g., Sunday
Times, 2008, and Daily Telegraph, 2009). In these examples, bargainers secure a reduction with
some probability that depends on the specics of the interaction between the consumer and the
given sales representative. Such stochastic discounting is also a feature of the marketing strat-
egy of oering discount coupons, which is widespread: Musalem et al. (2008) report that 286
billion coupons were issued in the United States in 2006. Coupons or vouchers can be delivered
by direct mail, or by being placed in media outlets such as newspapers or the Internet; these
reductions, however, are discovered by the target consumers only with some probability.
In this paper, we study the eect of discounting on price competition between rms when a
fraction of consumers (termed `bargainers') can be strategically oered discounts o list prices
that they receive with some probability. We nd that even though bargainers often receive
reductions o list prices, stochastic discounts raise all prices and cause a misallocation of goods to
consumers that lowers total welfare. Furthermore, when the rms interact repeatedly, discounts
facilitate collusion by the rms.
We develop a tractable model of dierentiated product price competition followed by strategi-
cally chosen stochastic discounts. First, the two rms simultaneously set list prices that become
common knowledge. `Price takers' buy at list prices. After the list prices become known, each
rm can also choose to oer a discount price that `bargainers' secure with some probability less
than one. We call this probability the `discount reliability'. Both categories of consumer are
uniformly distributed along a Hotelling line, and so share a common view of product dierenti-
ation.
In Section 3.1, we oer two specic interpretations of this model of stochastic discounts, which
motivate the assumption that discounts are received stochastically. We provide a summary here:
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 Our leading interpretation is that the model captures explicit bargaining in a simple and
tractable way. `Price takers' do not attempt to bargain, while `bargainers' approach both
rms to ask for a better price than the one posted. A bargainer receives a particular rm's
reduced price oer with probability less than one. This assumption captures in a simple
way the fact that bargaining is uncertain: the psychological costs and tension of bargaining
and the danger of frayed emotions lead to the possibility that negotiations between the
sales representative and the consumer break down.
 Our second interpretation is that the model captures the use of discount coupons. `Bar-
gainers' regularly visit websites or newspapers in which rms oer discount coupons, while
`price takers' do not. The assumption that discount price oers are received with probabil-
ity less than one captures the fact that the bargainers do not always nd a rm's coupon
(e.g., due to inattention, not visiting the website at the right time, not getting the right
issue of the newspaper).
Stochastic discounts aect the optimal pricing strategy in important ways. In particular,
we demonstrate that list prices and the stochastic discounts act as strategic complements. The
reason is that a rm's list price is relevant not only to price takers, but also to bargainers who
fail to receive the rm's own discount price oer (e.g., who fail to discover the rm's discount
coupon, or who fail to close a deal with the rm's sales representative). More specically, the
rm's list price will compete with the rival rm's discount price for bargainers who fail to receive
the rm's own discount price oer but who do receive the rival's discount price. Thus, when a
rm raises its list price, it becomes less of a competitive threat for such bargainers, which in turn
gives the rival rm an incentive to increase its discount price (the strategic complementarity).
This softening of the competition for bargainers leads to higher equilibrium discount prices at
the discounting stage, and thus to higher prots from bargainers. Anticipating these benets
encourages the rms to raise their list prices, and so in equilibrium list prices and discount price
oers rise above the standard (Hotelling) level.
The moderating inuence on competition brought about by bargainers and stochastic dis-
counts not only increases prices, but also raises prots and lowers both consumer surplus and
welfare. Prices are a transfer from consumers to rms: hence higher prices are welfare neutral.
However, stochastic discounts also lower welfare: a bargainer who happens to receive a discount
price oer from only one rm might be left with the choice between paying a high list price
for the product she prefers and a lower discounted price for the less attractive product. The
consumer can, in eect, be bribed to accept a less-ideal product. This generates some misallo-
cation of products to consumers, which lowers the eciency of the market. Furthermore, as the
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proportion of bargainers in the market increases, all prices rise at an increasing rate (both list
prices and discount price oers), and welfare falls at an increasing rate.
We also study the eect of stochastic discounts on the ability of the industry to sustain
collusive outcomes, thus extending our work to a dynamic setting. To simplify the analysis,
we consider the case where the products are perfect substitutes. However, we also extend our
analysis by allowing any number of rmsN  2 to compete in the market. We nd that discounts
facilitate collusion. The mechanism is that discounts lower the prots available from deviating
on a collusive agreement. If a rm deviates only in the discounts that it oers, it foregoes any
increase in the market share of price takers. If, instead, a rm deviates by lowering its publicly
posted list price, then the rival rms can respond by discounting more aggressively. In either
case the increase in market share available to rms from a deviation is reduced, thus allowing
collusion to be sustained at lower discount factors than would be possible without discounting.
To illustrate the insights of our analysis, consider the setting of the Harvard Business School
case, The Toy Game (Brandenburger, 1995). As the case notes, collecting miniature cars is
a game to children, but it is big business for Matchbox and Hot Wheels, two leading brands.
Matchbox and Hot Wheels compete in retail prices; they also decide how aggressively to oer
rebates via discount coupons. The case simplies by studying couponing when children have
observable idiosyncratic preferences over the cars, which can be used as the basis for price dis-
crimination and targeted coupon delivery. We avoid this simplication in our analysis. Suppose
instead that the rms cannot observe the children's preferences and can only imperfectly deliver
coupons to the children (e.g., by placing coupons in the press or on the Internet). Some, but not
all, children will pick up a coupon for one or even both cars. Our analysis delivers answers to
many natural questions that one might ask of couponing competition in this environment. For
instance, we will show that couponing raises prices to those children who buy at the list prices,
and to those who get a coupon. Furthermore, welfare declines, since children who nd only one
coupon may buy the car that they prefer least on account of the price dierential between list
and coupon prices. We will also show that when there is no dierentiation between the cars,
couponing facilitates collusion between Matchbox and Hot Wheels.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 relates our results to the existing literature; Section
3 sets out the model; Section 4 characterizes the equilibria; Section 5 conducts comparative
statics on prices, prots and welfare; Section 6 considers collusion; Section 7 discusses robustness;
and Section 8 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
3
2 Relation to the literature
It is common for consumers to receive discounts o list prices: in Section 1 we noted evi-
dence from a number of sources of stochastic discounting in automobile retailing, realtor fees,
travel agents and furniture stores, among others. Our model contributes to the economics and
marketing literature on dierentiated product price competition by characterizing the eect of
strategically chosen stochastic discounts o previously posted list prices on those list prices,
discount price oers, prots and welfare.
A small and recent literature considers the consequences of discounts and bargaining when
some consumers take list or posted prices as given. Korn (2007) and Zeng et al. (2007) consider
monopolists, and so are silent about the implications of discounts on competitive outcomes,
which is the focus of this study.1 Desai and Purohit (2004) and Zeng et al. (2007) focus on
the marketing decision of whether to permit bargaining or not. In Desai and Purohit (2004),
when both rms permit bargaining, the list prices are irrelevant to the bargainers since they are
never eective outside options; thus the strategic interaction between list prices and discount
prices is severed. Raskovich (2007) nds that a big enough proportion of bargainers causes list
prices to jump from marginal cost to the monopoly price. The mechanism is dierent than ours:
Raskovich (2007) assumes the rms that post higher list prices are weaker bargainers and so are
more attractive to bargaining consumers. Finally, in complementary work, Gill and Thanassoulis
(2009) also nd that bargaining can raise prices. However, the setup in Gill and Thanassoulis
(2009) is rather dierent: (i) the rms compete in quantities, with a Cournot auctioneer setting
a single public list price, and so the rms are not able to compete directly in list prices; (ii)
instead of using stochastic discounts, bargaining is modeled as an application of Burdett and
Judd (1983) search in which bargainers dier in the number of rms they approach, giving rise
to mixed-strategy equilibria instead of the pure-strategy equilibria that we nd here; and (iii)
the products are assumed to be homogeneous, thus precluding our analyses of the welfare loss
due to product misallocation and of how the eect of bargaining on prices, prots, consumer
surplus and welfare changes with the degree of product dierentiation. Furthermore, Gill and
Thanassoulis (2009) do not study the eects of bargaining on prots or welfare: they were
only able to show partial and ambiguous results for consumer surplus alone in special limiting
cases; instead, we are able to show that the presence of bargainers always increases prots while
lowering consumer surplus and welfare, and we can show that welfare is always falling as the
proportion of bargainers increases. Finally, we extend our analysis to repeated interaction and
1Kuo et al. (2011) and Kuo et al. (2012) also consider monopolists, with a focus on, respectively, inventory
management and supply chain relationships. As well as setting a posted price, in these papers the monopolist is
allowed to commit to a lower bound below which it will never sell.
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demonstrate that bargaining facilitates rm collusion, while Gill and Thanassoulis (2009) only
consider one-shot competition.
Our analysis demonstrates that the presence of bargainers can be bad for welfare and can
raise equilibrium list and discount prices. Our results therefore provide a possible justication
for the ndings of Davis and Holt (1994) and Cason et al. (2003), whose experiments show that
when consumers can haggle below a posted price, prices tend to be higher and eciency lower.
Much of the rest of the literature exploring bargaining in consumer markets examines the
choice between committing to a xed price and allowing consumers to bargain in the absence
of a posted price (e.g., Bester, 1993, Wang, 1995, Arnold and Lippman, 1998, Camera and
Delacroix, 2004, and Myatt and Rasmusen, 2009.) Chen et al. (2008) estimate a structural model
of competing bargained prices in a setting with no posted prices. There is also a small literature
on bargaining below a posted price when all consumers bargain (e.g., Chen and Rosenthal,
1996a, 1996b, and Camera and Selcuk, 2009). Although our results apply in the special case
when all consumers are bargainers (see Section 7.4), these prior works are not special cases of
ours since they include assumptions orthogonal to the ones we build on. In Chen and Rosenthal,
(1996a, 1996b), buyers have to incur inspection costs to nd out the value of the good, and so
the list price acts as a commitment to not exploit the bargainer after inspection costs have
been incurred. Chen and Rosenthal (1996b) consider only the case of a monopolist. Chen and
Rosenthal (1996a) also consider the case of duopolists who have just one good for sale each; as
a result, as soon as one rm trades the other becomes a monopolist. In Camera and Selcuk
(2009) the discount price is not chosen strategically, but is a function of the excess demand at
any given seller, and so rises if more buyers decide to approach a seller.
Our analysis also sheds light on the marketing practice of couponing, which as noted in Sec-
tion 1 is widespread. In particular, our contribution is to oer insight into how the opportunity
to oer coupons may alter competitive outcomes, both in terms of the depth of discounts and
the equilibrium level of the list prices themselves. Many prominent analyses of couponing focus
on monopoly settings, and so do not study the impact of coupons on competitive outcomes (e.g.,
Narasimhan, 1984, Anderson and Song, 2004). A few papers consider competitive couponing.
Shaer and Zhang (1995) assume that coupon reductions are set simultaneously with list prices,
thus severing the strategic interaction we study between list and reduced prices. Narasimhan
(1988) studies competition mainly in a setting in which rms can set only one price. An exten-
sion (Narasimhan, 1988, p.439) considers rms that deliver coupons to a subset of consumers.
However, the consumers that the rms compete over (the `switchers') receive each rm's coupon
for sure; thus, the list prices do not form a relevant competitive constraint, and so the strategic
interaction between the coupons and list prices does not arise. Dhar et al. (1996) consider the
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protability of dierent types of coupons, but only one rm is allowed to use coupons, and the
choice of list price is not considered. Finally, Rao (1991) studies competition in shelf-price re-
ductions o previously chosen `regular' prices (which act like coupons received by all consumers)
between a national brand (preferred by all consumers) and a local brand: the model is used to
show that the local brand does not discount in equilibrium.
Discounts o list or posted prices also occur in vertically-related industries. In healthcare,
Sorensen (2003) documents that in Connecticut many hospitals negotiate reductions o list
prices, with variation in the extent of the discounts. In retail petrol, Cook (1997) notes that
discounts are sometimes used as an inducement for the downstream rm to trade exclusively with
the upstream rm. Competition in these types of markets is dierent to the setting we study
here, since the buyers are competing among themselves for business downstream; nonetheless,
the ndings of our study may provide some insight into how bargaining aects competition at
the upstream level.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the rst to study dynamic repeated competition in
markets with discounts and list prices, and so the mechanism by which discounts facilitate col-
lusion in markets with public list prices is new. Our result complements the existing literature
that shows how collusion can be facilitated when rms operate in more than one market. Bern-
heim and Whinston (1990) nd that competing in multiple markets can make collusion easier
since rms are able to transfer excess punishment capacity from one market to another. This
theoretical prediction has been conrmed: the empirical literature provides evidence that multi-
market contact helps collusion in numerous industries such as airlines (Evans and Kessides,
1994), telephony (Parker and Roller, 1997) and cement (Jans and Rosenbaum, 1997). Spector
(2007) shows that if a rm is a monopolist in one market but competes in another, then bundling
can help collusion by shrinking the demand available in the competitive market.2 In both cases,
linkages across markets make collusion more sustainable, while our complementary results show
that strategic linkages across segments within a single market can also make collusion easier to
sustain. In particular, we nd that price deviations aimed at the price taker segment induce a
competitive response in the bargainer segment that reduces the incentive to deviate from any
collusive agreement.
Our analysis also complements a broader literature in which rms sell to two dierent types
of consumer. In Stahl (1989)'s model of search, consumers have high or low search costs. In
Rosenthal (1980), Varian (1980) and Narasimhan (1988), some consumers only consider buying
from one rm while others buy at the lowest price. In these papers the rms are unable to
2In contrast, Montero and Johnson (2012) identify a setting with multiple markets in which collusion is inhibited
by bundling.
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price discriminate between consumers, and this leads to mixed-strategy pricing equilibria. In
this paper, the competing rms are able to discriminate between consumers (bargainers and
price takers) by setting both list and discount prices, and our model yields pure-strategy pricing
equilibria in the one-shot game.3 Our price and welfare results can therefore be interpreted as
shedding light on the implications of competitive price discrimination; Section 7.9 develops this
point, and explicitly links our ndings to the existing literature on price discrimination.
3 The model of stochastic discounts
Two competing rms sell a dierentiated product and compete in prices. The rms have the
same constant marginal cost of production c  0, have no xed costs, and seek to maximize
their expected prots. To capture product dierentiation, we adopt the standard Hotelling
framework: the two rms are located at the opposite ends of a Hotelling line of length 1 with
a uniform density of consumers along it, and the consumers have a linear Hotelling `transport
cost' t > 0. As in Hotelling (1929), every consumer purchases exactly one unit and the market
is always covered. There are two types of consumer. A proportion  2 (0; 1) are `price takers',
and the remaining proportion 1    are `bargainers'. A consumer's type is independent of her
location on the Hotelling line, and rms cannot observe a consumer's location. We capture
stochastic discounts through the following two-stage game:
1. List-price-setting stage: The rms simultaneously choose publicly posted list prices li  0
and lj  0. Each price taker purchases at the list price that gives her the highest surplus
net of transport costs.
2. Discount stage: The rms simultaneously choose discount prices pi 2 [0; li] and pj 2 [0; lj ].
Each bargainer receives a particular rm's discount price oer with probability  2 (0; 1);
we call this probability the `discount reliability'. If the bargainer does not receive the
price oer, she is still able to purchase at the public list price.4 Each bargainer buys at
the available price that gives her the highest surplus net of transport costs.5
In Section 7 we discuss the importance of various assumptions of the model for our results,
beginning in Section 7.1 with a discussion of the assumption that discounts are stochastically
received (i.e., that  2 (0; 1)).
3When we study collusion with perfect substitutes in Section 6, we do nd that immediately following a
deviation in list prices, and so o the equilibrium path, the rms set discount prices according to a mixed
strategy. The mechanism giving rise to mixing for this segment is related to that which gives rise to mixing for
the whole market in these earlier papers.
4The random draws that determine whether discount price oers are received are independent across rms
and bargainers.
5All consumers randomize in the event of a tie.
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3.1 Two interpretations
We oer two specic interpretations of this model of stochastic discounts.
3.1.1 Explicit bargaining
Our leading interpretation is that the model captures explicit bargaining. Reecting real-world
bargaining, bargainers actively approach both rms to ask for a better price than the one posted.
The rms simultaneously choose the discount prices to oer to bargainers, which act as nal
take-it-or-leave-it oers. The game timing and strategic choice over the price to oer bargainers
capture that rms can adjust their bargaining policy in response to their rival's choice of list
price. The assumption that discount price oers are received with probability  2 (0; 1) captures
that bargaining may break down or that sales sta may dier in their willingness and ability to
negotiate and give discounts.6 However, the list prices are binding and thus are always available.
Under this interpretation, the dierence between price takers and bargainers can be moti-
vated by consumers having either high or low personal costs of bargaining.7 We can think of
price takers as consumers who suer signicant bargaining costs: the costs could be real, e.g.,
time costs, or psychological, e.g., the embarrassment of starting a negotiation; alternatively, the
price takers are not aware that discounts might be available. Bargainers, on the other hand,
have low costs of bargaining and are aware that rms are willing to negotiate. Given their low
costs of bargaining, it is natural to assume that the bargainers approach both rms for a better
price oer.
3.1.2 Discount coupons
Our second interpretation is that the model captures settings in which rms oer discount
coupons through media sources, such as websites or newspapers, that are regularly visited by
`bargainers'. Discount coupons allow consumers to buy at a xed discounted price. The assump-
tion that discount price oers are received with probability  2 (0; 1) captures that bargainers
who visit the media source do not always nd a rm's coupon. Instead of being passive recipi-
ents of coupon discounts, we could also think of the bargainers as consumers with a low cost of
time who nd it worthwhile actively to seek out discount opportunities, while price takers have
a high cost of time and so do not pay attention to, or search for, discount coupons. To similar
6Bargaining models with an exogenous probability of breakdown have been studied by, for instance, Binmore
et al. (1986), Stole and Zwiebel (1996) and de Fontenay and Gans (2005).
7This heterogeneity in bargaining costs parallels the heterogeneity in personal search costs adopted in the
search literature. For example, in Stahl (1989) search costs are low or high. Note, however, that under this
interpretation bargainers are doing more than searching: they are actively inviting sellers to beat their publicly
posted list prices.
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eect, bargainers may suer shocks to their available time so that their ability to collect each
rm's discount coupon, or to redeem it before it expires, is random.
4 Equilibrium analysis
We proceed by backward induction to nd the symmetric pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash
equilibria of the two-stage game.8 In order to prove the existence of equilibrium, we make the
action space compact: we do so by restricting list prices to lie at or below marginal cost plus
twice the transport cost, that is li; lj  2t + c:9 We also restrict all prices to lie at or above
marginal cost, that is li; lj ; pi; pj  c.10 In Proposition 1 we show that there exists a unique
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium at the discount stage for any combination of list prices chosen
at the list-price-setting stage. Given these equilibrium discount price oers, in Proposition 2
we show that there exists a unique symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium at the list-price-
setting stage with list prices dierent from the standard Hotelling level t + c: An equilibrium
at the standard Hotelling level also exists, but we explain below why we do not nd such an
equilibrium compelling. Throughout this section, when we wish to identify the rms according
to their list prices, we use rm 1 and rm 2 to denote that l1  l2:
We start by characterizing the equilibrium discount price oers as a function of the list prices
chosen at the list-price-setting stage.
8The two list prices are common knowledge; furthermore, in the equilibria we study they are equal. This holds
throughout the manuscript. Nonetheless, we need to solve the discount stage given unequal list prices to allow us
to consider the eect of deviations at the list-price-setting stage.
9Proving existence is challenging because the prot function at the discount stage is the sum of two quasi-
concave functions. As a result, best-response functions at the discount stage might be discontinuous, and so
equilibrium discount price oers might not be continuous in the list prices chosen at the list-price-setting stage.
When we make the action space compact by restricting li; lj  2t+c, we are able to show that there exists a unique
pure-strategy equilibrium at the discount stage and that the equilibrium discount price oers are continuous in
the list prices chosen at the list-price-setting stage. A compact action space might arise naturally if: (i) there
exist potential entrants that will enter the market protably if prices rise too high or (ii) consumer valuations are
bounded. Finally, we note that the equilibrium prices are always far from the upper bound: it is straightforward
to show that the equilibrium prices in (2) are always closer to the standard Hotelling level of t+ c than they are
to the upper bound of 2t+ c.
10This assumption is without loss of generality, since pricing at marginal cost gives weakly higher prots than
pricing below marginal cost.
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Proposition 1 Given any list prices l1  l2 such that l1; l2 2 [c; 2t + c]; there exists a unique
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium at the discount stage given by:
1. p1 =
1
2   (t+ c) +

1  1
2  

2l2 + l1
2 + 

p2 =
1
2   (t+ c) +

1  1
2  

2l1 + l2
2 + 

when 12  (t+ c) +

1  12 

2l1+l2
2+

 l2; and
2. p1 = min

t+ c+ l2
2
; l1

p2 = l2
when 12  (t+ c) +

1  12 

2l1+l2
2+

> l2:
Proposition 1 shows that the equilibrium discount price oers are increasing in the list prices
that were set at the list-price-setting stage. To understand this result, we present here a rm's
best-response function in the discount stage when the rival sets a discount price at or above the
standard Hotelling level (derived in Lemma 6 within the proof of Proposition 1):
pi = min

(t+ c) + (1  ) lj + pj
2
; li

when pj  t+ c: (1)
Recall that a rm's discount price pi is bounded above by the rm's list price li, which was
set at the list-price-setting stage. At an interior best response in the discount stage, rm i is
competing for: (i) bargainers who receive the rival's discount price oer pj ; and (ii) bargainers
who do not receive the rival's discount price oer, and so can buy from the rival only at its list
price lj . The probability that a bargainer receives the rival's discount price oer is , and so in
expectation the rm is competing against a price of (1  ) lj+pj . The best-response function
(1) shows that rm i undercuts this expected price by taking an average of this expected price
and the standard Hotelling price of t+ c.
Thus, if rm j raises its list price at the list-price-setting stage, then rm i has an incentive
to increase its discount price in the discount stage, since rm j's list price is less of a competitive
threat in the competition for bargainers who do not receive the rival's (that is, rm j's) discount
price oer: dpi =dlj = (1 )=2 > 0. This softening of competition at the discount stage induces
rm j to increase its own discount price, since i's discount price is less of a competitive threat
in the competition for bargainers who do receive the rival's (that is, rm i's) discount price
oer: dpj=dpi = =2 > 0. The intersection of the best-response functions yields the equilibrium
discount price oers given in Proposition 1. The list prices and discount prices are strategic
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complements, since an increase in a rm's list price increases both rms' equilibrium discount
price oers.
This eect applies to more than just bargaining. In the couponing interpretation of our
model, a higher rival list price implies that customers who fail to pick up a rival's discount coupon
can be attracted with a less generous coupon, thus pushing down the equilibrium reductions that
coupons oer.
This strategic dynamic link between list prices and subsequent discounting is key to the
results that we will generate in our analysis. The corollary below describes the equilibrium
discount price oers for symmetric list prices.
Corollary 1 Given any symmetric list prices l1 = l2 = l 2 [c; 2t+ c] ; there exists a unique
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium at the discount stage given by:
(a) p1 = p

2 =
1
2   (t+ c) +

1  1
2  

l 2 (t+ c; l)
when l > t+ c; and
(b) p1 = p

2 = l
when l  t+ c.
We can see that when the list prices are above the standard Hotelling level of t + c, the
equilibrium discount prices are a weighted average of the standard Hotelling price and the list
prices. Thus, when responding to the bargainers, the rms push their discount price oers
away from the standard Hotelling level and up toward the prevailing list prices. How far the
equilibrium discount prices are from the list prices depends upon the discount reliability . The
higher is , the greater is the proportion of bargainers that receives the rival's discount price
oer. When setting its discount price, a rm trades o the incentive to compete aggressively for
bargainers who receive the rival's discount price oer and less aggressively for bargainers who
do not receive the rival's discount price oer, and so can buy from the rival only at its list price.
As the discount reliability  increases, the rst set of bargainers grows at the expense of the
second set, and so the equilibrium discount prices move toward the standard Hotelling level.
We now turn to the rms' decision as to what list prices to set.
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Proposition 2 Given li; lj 2 [c; 2t + c]; (i) there exists a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equi-
librium at the list-price-setting stage given by:
l = (t+ c) + t
24 2 (1  ) (2  )

1 

(4  2) (2  ) + 2 (1  ) (4  2 + 2)
35 2 (t+ c; 2t+ c) ; (2)
and (ii) there are no other symmetric pure-strategy equilibria with l 6= t+ c:
If the rms considered only the price takers, prices would be set just as in the standard
Hotelling model, and so the only equilibrium list prices would be l = t + c. However, when
thinking about how to set list prices, the rms also anticipate how the chosen list prices will
aect competition at the discount stage. We saw above that list prices and discount prices are
strategic complements: the higher the list prices, the weaker the competitive challenge for the
custom of those bargainers who do not receive the stochastic discount from the rival, and so
the higher the discount price oers that can be supported in equilibrium. This eect implies
that the presence of the bargainers moderates competitive forces in the market by reducing the
incentive to undercut any given rival list price. Proposition 2 describes the unique equilibrium
in which this moderating force allows list prices to rise above the standard Hotelling level of
t+ c.
The equilibrium list price (2) is a function of the proportion of price takers  and the discount
reliability , as well as the more frequently studied parameters of product dierentiation t and
marginal cost c. In Section 5, we will explore in detail the comparative statics of the price
levels and welfare with respect to these parameters. Among other results, we will show that the
equilibrium list prices and discount price oers always increase as the proportion of bargainers
1  goes up, and that the equilibrium list prices and discount price oers are quasi-concave in
the discount reliability .
Proposition 2 further shows that no equilibrium can exist with list prices below the standard
Hotelling level, that is with l < t+ c. If such an equilibrium existed, then a rm could increase
prots from both bargainers and price takers by deviating and raising its list price toward the
standard Hotelling level.
Remark 1 notes that we cannot rule out an equilibrium in which the rms set list prices at
the standard Hotelling level, that is with l = t+ c (in such an equilibrium, by Corollary 1 the
discount prices are also at the Hotelling level).
Remark 1 The equilibrium price t+ c in the standard Hotelling model without bargainers also
constitutes an equilibrium at the list-price-setting stage.
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However, this equilibrium is not a compelling one to study or to expect for at least two
reasons. First, from the rms' perspective an equilibrium at Hotelling prices is Pareto dominated
by the equilibrium with l > t+c (prots in this equilibrium are higher since all prices are higher
and the market is covered). Second, the equilibrium is not stable in the following sense: if rm j
were to set a list price of lj = t+c+" for some arbitrarily small " > 0; then at this slightly higher
list price rm i would have an incentive to increase its list price beyond lj = t+ c+ ", and thus
move its list price even further from the Hotelling level. By contrast, the equilibrium oered in
Proposition 2 is stable in this sense.11 This formalizes the idea that there is something knife-edge
about prices at the Hotelling level. At any symmetric list prices between the Hotelling level and
the equilibrium with l > t + c, there is upward pressure on the list prices: an increase in a
rm's list price raises the rival's discount price, thus softening competition for the bargainers and
increasing that rm's total prots. However, exactly at the Hotelling list prices, the discount
prices hit their upper bound, and hence a small upward list price deviation cannot induce a
corresponding upward shift in the rival's discount price oer. For both of these reasons it
appears to us more defensible to focus on the price-increasing equilibrium. Thus, in the next
section, we study the more interesting and Pareto-dominant equilibrium with l > t+c in which
the bargainers do in fact aect competition between the rms.
5 Comparative statics of prices, prots and welfare
In this section, we analyze the properties of the equilibrium with list prices above the standard
Hotelling level, that is with l > t+ c, outlined in Proposition 2.12 Using Part (a) of Corollary 1
in Section 4, the equilibrium discount price oers are given by
p =
1
2   (t+ c) +

1  1
2  

l, (3)
a weighted average of the list prices and the standard Hotelling price.
Proposition 3 Compared to the benchmark with only price takers, the presence of bargainers:
(i) raises the list prices and discount price oers; (ii) raises the rms' prots; (iii) lowers
consumer surplus; and (iv) lowers total welfare.
11By construction of the symmetric equilibrium l > t + c; [di=dli]li=lj=l = 0: From the proof of Claim 4
in the proof of Proposition 2, setting li = lj = l > t + c; [di=dli]li=lj=l is a linear function of l with a strictly
negative slope. This implies that for l 2 (t+ c; l) we must have [di=dli]li=lj=l > 0 and for l > l
 we must have
[di=dli]li=lj=l < 0.
12Throughout this section and the related proofs, for notational clarity we omit the stars when referring to
equilibrium prices.
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Proposition 3 is a key result of our study. Once some of the consumers become `bargainers',
that is they are willing to bargain explicitly or collect coupons, the list prices rise. Section 4
described in detail how the presence of bargainers moderates competition: higher list prices allow
equilibrium discount prices to rise, since higher list prices weaken the competitive challenge for
the custom of those bargainers who do not receive the stochastic discount from the rival. This
strategic complementarity between list and discount prices reduces the incentive to undercut
the rival's list price, leading to higher equilibrium list prices, which in turn give rise to higher
equilibrium discount prices. As a result, prots must rise, and consumer surplus must fall since
the market is covered. This delivers results (i), (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 3. The higher
prices are a transfer from consumers to rms, and so are welfare neutral using a total surplus
criterion.13 Nonetheless, welfare falls because of the stochastic nature of the discounts. A
bargainer who happens to receive a discount price oer from only one rm might be left with
the choice between paying a high list price for the product she prefers and a lower discount price
for the less-attractive product. This generates some misallocation of products to consumers,
which lowers the eciency of the market, yielding result (iv) of Proposition 3.
So far we have compared a market with a positive fraction of bargainers to the standard case
where all consumers buy at the list prices. Next, we consider the eect of marginal changes in
model parameters on prices (Section 5.1) and welfare (Section 5.2).
5.1 Prices
We start by reporting the eect of marginal changes in the proportion of bargainers on prices.
Proposition 4 As the proportion of bargainers increases: (i) the list prices rise; (ii) the dis-
count price oers rise; and (iii) the dierence between the list prices and the discount price oers
also rises. Furthermore, all three rise at an increasing rate.
The moderating inuence of bargainers on competition means that both list prices and
discount price oers go up as we increase the proportion of bargainers in the market: the list
prices become increasingly set to allow prots to be made from the bargainers at the discount
stage, which in turn allows the discount prices to rise. Proposition 4 further tells us that
the list prices go up faster than the discount prices: the gap becomes larger since discount
prices are a weighted average of the list prices and the standard Hotelling price (see (3) above),
where the weights do not depend on the proportion of bargainers (given the list prices, discount
prices only target the bargainers). Finally, we can see that the prices go up at an increasing
13Many competition authorities focus mainly on consumer surplus instead of on the sum of consumer and
producer surplus. This is the case in the United Kingdom and the European Union for example. For such market
regulators an increase in prices as compared to the Hotelling benchmark would be unwelcome per se.
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rate: as bargainers become more prevalent in the population of consumers, the reduction in the
competitive pressure on list prices becomes increasingly powerful, resulting in a convex increase
in the list prices. Since the discount prices are a weighted average of the list prices and the
standard Hotelling price, the discount prices also inherit this convexity. The left-hand panel
of Figure 1 (between Propositions 7 and 8) portrays this convexity graphically for discount
reliability  = 1=2.
Recall that our model assumes that the proportion of bargainers 1   2 (0; 1); however, as
the proportion of bargainers tends to zero, the prices tend to the standard Hotelling level, and as
the proportion of bargainers tends to 1, the prices tend to their level when all consumers bargain.
Section 7.4 explains in detail how our equilibrium and comparative statics results extend to the
case when all consumers bargain.
Next we conduct comparative statics of the prices with respect to the discount reliability .
Proposition 5 The list prices, the discount price oers, and the dierence between the list
prices and the discount price oers are quasi-concave in the discount reliability . Furthermore,
the discount price oers peak at a lower discount reliability than do the list prices.
First, let us recall how discount prices change in the discount reliability , holding list prices
xed. As explained in the discussion following Corollary 1 in Section 4, the discount prices given
in (3) are a weighted average of the standard Hotelling price and the list prices, with the weight
on the standard Hotelling price increasing in the discount reliability . Briey, as bargainers
become more likely to receive the rival's discount price oer, competition for the bargainers
becomes more intense, driving the discount prices down relative to the list prices.
Now, let us consider the eect of  on the list prices. When a rm raises its list price, there
are two competing eects on prots. First, holding discount prices xed, the rm loses market
share among price takers and among those bargainers who fail to receive its discount price oer.
Second, the higher list price increases the equilibrium discount prices. Overall, the incentive to
increase list prices is highest for intermediate values of discount reliability . When the discount
reliability  is low, the rst eect dominates, since few bargainers receive the discount price
oers. When the discount reliability  is high, the rst eect dominates once again: since the
bargainers are likely to receive both discount price oers, intense competition for the bargainers
drives discount prices toward the standard Hotelling level, and so a list price increase has little
eect on the equilibrium discount prices.
Given that the discount prices are a weighted average of the standard Hotelling price and the
list prices, the quasi-concavity of the discount prices follows from the quasi-concavity of the list
prices, as does the quasi-concavity of the dierence between the list prices and discount prices.
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Furthermore, the discount prices peak at a lower value of  than do the list prices because, as
noted above, the weight placed on the list prices falls in .
We now consider the comparative statics of prices with respect to product dierentiation.
Proposition 6 As the degree of product dierentiation t increases: (i) the list prices rise; (ii)
the discount price oers rise; and (iii) the dierence between the list prices and the discount
price oers also rises. Furthermore, the list prices and discount price oers rise faster than do
prices in the benchmark with only price takers.
As the degree of product dierentiation between the rms increases, price reductions capture
a smaller share of consumers, and so competition in both the discount stage and the list-price-
setting stage is relaxed. This explains why both prices rise. The strategic complementarity
between list prices and discount prices allows prices to rise more rapidly than in the benchmark
with only price takers. Finally, the dierence between the list prices and discount prices rises
since the discount prices are a weighted average of the list prices and the standard Hotelling
price, with the weight depending on the discount reliability (see (3) above).
5.2 Welfare
We now turn to the comparative statics of welfare, starting with how welfare changes in the
proportion of bargainers.
Proposition 7 As the proportion of bargainers increases, total welfare falls. Furthermore, total
welfare falls at an increasing rate.
Proposition 7 tells us that welfare is always decreasing in the proportion of bargainers. Since
the market is covered, and so prices are just a transfer from consumers to rms, the eect of
bargainers on welfare depends only on how the bargainers aect the (mis)allocation of goods
to consumers. We noted in Proposition 4(iii) that the greater the proportion of bargainers, the
greater the dierence between the list prices and the discount prices. This increasing disparity
makes bargainers who receive a discount price oer from only one of the rms more likely to
settle for a lower-priced but less-attractive product, thus worsening the misallocation of goods.
Furthermore, as the proportion of bargainers goes up, some price takers become bargainers
who receive only one discount price oer, and who might therefore be tempted to buy a less-
attractive but discounted product. Welfare falls at an increasing rate because of the convexity of
the dierence between list prices and discount prices reported in Proposition 4. Figure 1 shows
graphically how prices and welfare change in the proportion of bargainers.
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Notes: The proportion of bargainers (1   ) increases from 0 to 1 as the proportion of price takers  falls from
1 to 0. The dot in each graph gives the benchmark case of Hotelling competition with only price takers. Both
graphs are drawn to scale, with  = 1=2. The welfare graph normalizes surplus from a product at a consumer's
exact location on the Hotelling line to zero.
Figure 1: Prices and welfare as the proportion of bargainers (1  ) changes
Next we explore how welfare is aected by the discount reliability .
Proposition 8 Total welfare is quasi-convex in the discount reliability .
As noted above, since the market is covered, the eect of bargainers on welfare depends
only on how the bargainers aect the (mis)allocation of goods to consumers. This misallocation
is increasing in: (a) the dierence between the list prices and discount prices, which makes
bargainers who receive a discount price oer from only one of the rms more likely to settle
for a lower-priced but less-attractive product; and (b) the proportion of bargainers who receive
only one discount price oer. We know from Proposition 5 that the dierence between the list
prices and discount prices is quasi-concave in . Furthermore, the proportion of bargainers who
receive only one discount price oer, 2(1 ), is also quasi-concave in . Thus, welfare inherits
its quasi-convexity in .
Proposition 8 implies that a social planner who wished to maximize welfare would prefer
extremes of the discount reliability parameter . With intermediate discount reliability, many
bargainers will receive only one discount price oer, and this price will be signicantly below
the posted list prices, thus encouraging such bargainers to buy from a seller that is not their
best match.
It is not easy to subdivide welfare into the behavior of consumer surplus and prots; however
some results are available.
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Proposition 9 When the discount reliability  is not too high, the rms' prots rise and con-
sumer surplus falls as the proportion of bargainers increases.
List prices, discount prices, and the dierence between them, increase in the proportion of
bargainers (Proposition 4). The marginal impact on prots and consumer surplus is not clear-
cut, since a greater proportion of consumers buy at the discount price. When the discount
reliability is not too high, the increase in prices is the dominant factor.
Finally, we turn to the behavior of prots and welfare as a function of product dierentiation.
Proposition 10 As the degree of product dierentiation t increases: (i) the rms' prots rise;
(ii) consumer surplus falls; and (iii) total welfare falls. Furthermore, prots rise faster than in
the benchmark with only price takers, while consumer surplus and welfare fall faster than in the
benchmark.
We know from Proposition 6 that as the degree of product dierentiation increases, the list
prices and discount prices rise, and do so faster than in the benchmark with only price takers,
while the dierence between the list prices and discount prices also goes up. As a result, prots
rise faster than in the benchmark. The increase in prices unambiguously increases prots, since
the proportion of bargainers buying at the discount prices does not the change: the increased
dierentiation makes bargainers less sensitive to price dierences, and in our model this eect
exactly cancels the bigger gap between list prices and discount prices. The higher transport
costs cause welfare to fall directly, and also worsen the loss in welfare from misallocated products
(even though the extent of misallocation does not change), and so welfare falls faster than in
the benchmark. Consumer surplus also falls faster than in the benchmark, given that prots
increase faster and welfare falls faster.14
6 Collusion
Thus far we have analyzed one-shot competition and demonstrated that the presence of bargain-
ers reduces the competitive pressure on rms when setting their list prices, thus allowing list
prices, and subsequently discount prices, to rise. In this section we study dynamic competition
in markets with both bargainers and price takers. In particular, we study the ability of the rms
to collude on a price z that is the same at both the list-price-setting stage and the discount stage
(and so l = p under collusion), and we will conclude that the presence of bargainers can facilitate
collusion by lowering the critical discount factor above which collusion can be sustained.
14The comparative statics with respect to cost are straightforward. Just like in the benchmark with only price
takers: (i) increases in marginal cost c lead to a one-to-one increase in prices; (ii) the rms' prots are independent
of marginal cost; (iii) consumer surplus falls one-to-one in marginal cost; and (iv) total welfare falls one-to-one in
marginal cost. Proofs and intuition can be found in Gill and Thanassoulis (2015) (see Propositions 7 and 12).
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6.1 Dynamic model of stochastic discounts
To study dynamic repeated competition with both bargainers and price takers, we assume that
the rms interact for an innite number of periods, and that in each period they play the two-
stage game described in Section 3. We further assume that the rms apply a per-period common
discount factor  2 (0; 1) to prots, but that they do not discount within periods (i.e., prots
from bargainers at the discount stage are not discounted relative to prots from price takers).15
We extend our analysis by allowing any number of rms N  2 to compete in the market.
At the same time, we simplify the analysis by only considering the case t = 0, that is perfect
substitutes. Unlike the analysis in Section 4, we do not impose any upper bound on list prices.
6.2 Equilibrium concept and o-equilibrium punishment
We approach the question of collusion in the standard way of seeking a symmetric subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium in which the rms collude on a common price z > c: Since our analysis
allows for both list price setting and discounts, we investigate collusion in which the rms collude
on the same price z at both the list-price-setting stage and the discount stage.16 As is common
in collusion analyses, we focus on collusive equilibria supported by the threat of reversion to the
lowest-payo non-collusive symmetric equilibrium.
If a rm deviates from the collusive price z at the discount stage, from the next period
onward the rms revert to the unique symmetric pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium of the one-
shot two-stage game.17 In this non-collusive equilibrium, by the standard logic of Bertrand price
competition with perfect substitutes, all prices are at marginal cost and prots are zero: a rm
which undercuts its rivals' list price by an arbitrarily small amount secures the business of all
the price takers.
If, instead, a rm deviates from the collusive price z at the list-price-setting-stage, the
rms immediately revert within period to the unique non-collusive symmetric equilibrium of
the discount stage, and from the next period onward then revert to the zero-prot equilibrium
of the one-shot two-stage game. In the within-period non-collusive symmetric equilibrium of
the discount stage immediately following a list-price deviation, discount prices are given by a
15We abstract from within-period discounting of prots for simplicity. However, all our results would extend if
the rms applied a within-period discount factor 2 2 (0; 1) to prots from bargainers, since the rms would then
behave as if the proportion of price takers was 2 = =[ + (1   )2] 2 (0; 1) and the proportion of bargainers
was (1  2) = (1  )2=[+ (1  )2] 2 (0; 1).
16If we introduce a common maximum willingness to pay v > c, then our analysis applies for any collusive price
z 2 (c; v]. When z = v, the rms collude on the monopoly price.
17If the rms cannot directly observe discount price oers, they can still detect deviations at the discount stage,
since the deviant rm captures the proportion  of bargainers who receive the deviant rm's discount price oer.
19
mixed-strategy equilibrium and prots are positive.18
6.3 Collusive equilibrium with bargaining
Having discussed how deviations are punished, we are now in a position to consider collusion in
the innitely-repeated game. Proposition 11 shows that bargainers facilitate collusion.
Proposition 11 Consider a market with N  2 rms. When goods are perfect substitutes, the
presence of bargainers facilitates collusion compared to the benchmark with only price takers:
the critical discount factor that allows collusion to be subgame perfect is strictly lower with
bargainers.
The reason that the presence of bargainers facilitates collusion is that the opportunity to oer
discounts to bargainers lowers the prots available from deviating on a collusive agreement. If a
rm deviates only in the discount prices that it oers, it foregoes any increase in the market share
of price takers. If, instead, a rm deviates by lowering its publicly posted list price, then the rival
rms, observing this deviation, would respond by setting discount price oers more aggressively.
Which of the two possible deviations is optimal depends upon the parameters. In either case,
however, the increase in market share available to rms from a deviation is reduced, allowing
collusion to be sustained at lower discount factors than would be possible without discounting.
In the penultimate paragraph of Section 2, we discuss how our nding that linkages across
segments within a single market can make collusion easier to sustain complements the literature
on multi-market contact that nds that linkages across markets helps collusion (Bernheim and
Whinston, 1990).
Next we consider how the ease of collusion varies in the proportion of bargainers and in the
discount reliability.
Proposition 12 There is a threshold proportion of bargainers 1  b > 0 such that:
(i) when the proportion of bargainers lies above the threshold, the critical discount factor that
allows collusion to be subgame perfect increases in the proportion of bargainers; and
(ii) when the proportion of bargainers lies below the threshold, the critical discount factor de-
creases in the proportion of bargainers.
A higher proportion of bargainers increases the protability of deviating at the discount
stage by increasing the prot from undercutting rivals' collusive discount price oers. At the
18The details are in Lemma 10 in the proof of Proposition 11. This recourse to mixed strategies is a consequence
of the assumption of perfect substitutes: if a rm sets a discount price of pi > c for sure, then a rival could gain
the business of all the bargainers who receive both discount price oers (and no lower oers from other rms) by
just undercutting pi, while a rm that sets pi = c loses prots from bargainers who receive no other discount price
oers. In the mixed-strategy equilibrium, a rm trades o the incentive to price high to prot from bargainers
who receive few discount price oers against the incentive to price low to increase the probability of selling to
bargainers who receive many price oers.
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same time, a higher proportion of bargainers reduces the protability of deviating at the list-
price-setting stage by reducing the number of price takers who buy at the deviant list price and
increasing the impact on prots of the within-period reversion to competition for bargainers
at the discount stage. When the proportion of bargainers is large enough that deviating at
the discount stage is the more protable deviation, a marginal increase in the proportion of
bargainers increases the critical discount factor by increasing further the protability of deviating
at the discount stage. (Note that if the discount reliability  is low, no proportion of bargainers is
large enough to make deviating at the discount stage more protable: 1 b > 1, and so only case
(ii) applies.) When the proportion of bargainers is small enough that deviating at the list-price-
setting stage is more protable, a marginal increase in the proportion of bargainers decreases
the critical discount factor by decreasing the protability of deviating at the list-price-setting
stage.
Proposition 13 There is a threshold discount reliability b > 0 such that:
(i) when the discount reliability lies above the threshold, the critical discount factor that allows
collusion to be subgame perfect increases in discount reliability; and
(ii) when the discount reliability lies below the threshold, the critical discount factor decreases
in discount reliability.
A higher discount reliability  increases the protability of deviating at the discount stage
by increasing the proportion of bargainers that receive the deviant discount price oer. At the
same time, a higher discount reliability reduces the protability of deviating at the list-price-
setting stage by increasing the impact on prots of the within-period reversion to competition
for bargainers at the discount stage, since the competition for bargainers becomes more intense.
When the discount reliability is large enough that deviating at the discount stage is the more
protable deviation, a marginal increase in discount reliability increases the critical discount
factor by increasing further the protability of deviating at the discount stage. (Note that if
the proportion of bargainers 1  is low, no level of discount reliability is large enough to make
deviating at the discount stage more protable: b > 1, and so only case (ii) applies.) When
the discount reliability is small enough that deviating at the list-price-setting stage is more
protable, a marginal increase in discount reliability decreases the critical discount factor by
decreasing the protability of deviating at the list-price-setting stage.
7 Discussion and robustness
In this section we discuss the importance of various model assumptions for our results. Finally,
in Section 7.9, we reinterpret our work as competitive price discrimination and relate our results
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to the literature in this area.
7.1 Stochastic discounts
The stochastic nature of the discounts is captured by the fact that the probability  that
each bargainer receives a particular rm's discount price oer (the `discount reliability') lies
strictly in (0; 1). Such stochastic discounting has wide applicability; in Section 3.1 we described
interpretations for the case of bargaining and the case of couponing.
In Sections 4 and 5, we showed that the stochastic discounts create a strategic link between
list and discount prices that allows all prices to increase above the standard Hotelling level.
When  = 0 or  = 1, however, this strategic link is broken in the one-shot game. When
 = 0, the rms are not able to deliver discounts, and so the equilibrium list prices are the same
as in the standard Hotelling model. When  = 1, equilibrium list prices and discount price
oers cannot lie above the standard Hotelling level. Suppose they did: at the discount stage,
bargainers would receive both rms' discount price oers with certainty, and so competition for
bargainers would drive discount price oers to the standard Hotelling level; thus, the rms would
deviate downward at the list-price-setting stage, increasing prots from price takers without any
impact on the equilibrium discount price oers.
When  = 0 in the repeated game, the discount stage is irrelevant since discount price oers
are never received, and so the critical discount factor above which collusion can be sustained is
the same as in the benchmark with only price takers. When  = 1, however, the presence of
bargainers continues to facilitate collusion. The reason is that the opportunity to oer discounts
to bargainers continues to lower the prots available from deviating on a collusive agreement
in the way described in the paragraph following Proposition 11. Furthermore, Proposition 12,
which shows how the ability to collude varies in the proportion of bargainers, continues to hold.
7.2 Exogenous discount reliability
Our model assumes that the discount reliability  is common across rms and exogenously given.
Firms may have some scope to change their own discount reliability, for instance by training their
sales sta in bargaining techniques or by oering discount coupons through a greater number of
media sources. A full equilibrium analysis of each rm's choice of list price, discount price and
discount reliability is beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, we provide a partial analysis.
In particular we study whether, taking as given the equilibrium prices at a common discount
reliability , the rms have an incentive to deviate by changing their own discount reliability i
at the discount stage of the one-shot game.
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Remark 2 Taking as given the equilibrium prices at a common discount reliability , a rm
would increase its prots if it could raise its own discount reliability i at zero cost at the discount
stage of the one-shot game. As the common discount reliability  tends to one, the increase in
prots tends to zero.
Remark 2 shows that rms benet if they can increase their discount reliability compared
to the industry level. By increasing the probability with which its discount price oers are
received, a rm increases the proportion of bargainers that it sells to, but at the same time loses
revenue on bargainers who would have been willing to buy from the rm at its list price. At the
equilibrium list and discount price oers, the increase in volume always dominates.
Of course, in practice increasing discount reliability is likely to have a direct cost (e.g., costs of
training sta or paying media sources to advertise coupons). The exact specication of the costs
will depend on the specic environment. However, Remark 2 tells us that when the common
discount reliability approaches one, a rm's incentive to increase its own discount reliability falls
towards zero (this happens because the list and discount prices approach the standard Hotelling
level). Introducing a well-behaved explicit cost of increasing discount reliability would therefore
lead to a stable interior  from which the increase in prots from deviating by increasing i
is outweighed by the cost. Thus, our partial analysis provides support for active discounting
by rms as a robust feature of markets in which some consumers seek to bargain or a coupon
technology is available. It is therefore an important result that welfare is damaged when the
proportion of bargainers increases (Proposition 7).
When the rms collude successfully in the repeated game, prots do not depend on the
discount reliability. However, the payo from deviation does depend on the discount reliability.
Proposition 13 tells us that when the common discount reliability  is low, the rms have a joint
incentive to coordinate on a higher  in order to reduce the critical discount factor that allows
collusion to be subgame perfect.
7.3 Two-stage model
We have studied price competition with stochastic discounting in a two-stage model in which
rms rst set and observe each other's list prices, and then oer discounts that bargainers receive
stochastically. In this section, we note that this two-stage setup is crucial to our results.
Suppose that we changed our model so that the rms set their list prices and discount price
oers simultaneously, thus collapsing the competition to a single-stage game. In that case,
equilibrium list and discount price oers in the one-shot game could not lie above the standard
Hotelling level. The reason is that the rival rm would not be able to respond at the discount
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stage to a deviation in list prices, and so the standard Hotelling undercutting logic would apply.19
In the repeated game, the two-stage model is also indispensable to determine that bargainers
facilitate collusion on a common price z. If list prices and discount price oers were chosen
simultaneously in a single stage, then a rm could deviate from a candidate collusive equilibrium
by undercutting all prices slightly and so securing the full market demand. Thus, rms would
have the same incentive to deviate downward as in the benchmark with only price takers.
7.4 Two types of consumer
Our model includes two types of consumer: price takers and bargainers. We include these two
types because we think it natural that in many markets with posted prices, some consumers
will attempt to bargain down the price, while others will be unwilling to attempt to negotiate
with sellers, perhaps due to time constraints, psychological costs of engaging in bargaining, or
lack of information about the opportunities for bargaining. Furthermore, including the two
types of consumer allows us to conduct comparative statics in Section 5 on the proportion of
the bargaining type in the population. These comparative statics help us to understand how
bargaining aects competition in markets with posted prices, and they may also prove useful to
competition authorities when they consider whether to encourage bargaining in markets.
Nonetheless, we now consider what happens in our model if there are no price takers and
only bargainers in the population of consumers, that is if  = 0: All of our equilibrium results
for the one-shot game reported in Propositions 1 and 2 and in Remark 1 continue to hold. More
specically, the equilibrium list and discount prices reported in (2) and (3) continue to share
the same functional form, setting  = 0: The reason is that the dynamic link between the list
prices and discount price oers remains, since bargainers who receive only one discount price
oer continue to choose between that discount price oer and the other rm's list price. In
the case of the repeated game, Proposition 11 also continues to hold: bargainers continue to
facilitate collusion because not all bargainers receive a deviant rm's discount price oer, and
so a rm that deviates at the discount stage sells to only a fraction of the bargainers.
The comparative statics results in Sections 5 and 6.3 are also robust. In particular, Propo-
sition 3 continues to hold: prices and prots continue to be higher than in the benchmark with
only price takers, and consumer surplus and welfare continue to be lower. Furthermore, all the
comparative statics results with respect to the discount reliability  and the degree of product
19If l = p > t+ c, a small downward deviation in both li and pi would be protable just like in the standard
Hotelling model. If l > p  t + c, a small downward deviation in li would be protable (with respect to both
price takers and bargainers who failed to receive the rm's own discount price oer).
24
dierentiation also carry through: that is, Propositions 5, 6, 8, 10 and 13 continue to hold.20
7.5 Discount prices below list prices
We have assumed throughout this study that the list prices remain available to all consumers,
even in the discounting stage. In this sense, the assumption that the discount prices must lie
weakly below the list prices is without loss of generality: consumers would always select the
lower of the discount price and the list price if purchasing from a seller. The assumption that
list prices are always available to consumers is uncontroversial in the couponing interpretation
of the model. In the case of bargaining, this is also natural when the list prices are publicly
posted, as would be the case in many retail environments.
However it is possible to imagine that list prices could be withdrawn in some markets if
bargaining begins, and so the bargained price could be higher than the withdrawn list price.
If we changed our model so that list prices were not available to bargainers, discount price
oers would no longer be competing with the list prices. The strategic interaction that we have
studied between list prices and discount price oers would therefore be completely severed in
the one-shot game, and so the presence of bargainers would have no impact on the list prices
oered to price takers. Furthermore, bargainers would be exposed to the risk of receiving no
price oer at all, and so bargaining is unlikely to be a robust feature in such environments.
7.6 Unit demand
Our analysis has used the standard Hotelling model, in which consumers have unit demands and
the market is always covered. Thus, market demand is inelastic, although each rm's demand
is elastic since consumers can be won or lost to the rival rm. Introducing a downward-sloping
market demand function would complicate the analysis substantially. However, we conjecture
that downward-sloping market demand would not aect the key intuition that bargainers cause
all prices to rise. The reason is that the strategic link between list prices and discount price
oers would remain: higher list prices would continue to soften competition at the discount
stage. Furthermore, this softening of competition would continue to be protable for the rms,
since the benchmark equilibrium price with only price takers would continue to lie below the
monopoly level. Given our conjecture, the welfare loss from bargainers would be reinforced:
in addition to the misallocation of products to consumers caused by the gap between list and
discount prices, the higher prices would also lower total market demand. We also conjecture
20With respect to Proposition 5, when  = 0 the list prices and the dierence between the list prices and the
discount price oers are now always increasing in , and so no longer have an interior peak. Formally, this means
that they remain quasi-concave in . The discount prices retain an interior peak, while welfare (Proposition 8)
retains an interior trough.
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that, with downward-sloping market demand, bargainers would continue to facilitate collusion
compared to the benchmark with only price takers, since the opportunity to oer discounts to
bargainers would continue to lower the prots available from deviating on a collusive agreement
for the reasons described in the paragraph following Proposition 11.
7.7 Two competing rms
We extended our analysis to any number of competing rms when considering the eect of
bargainers on the ability to collude. However, we restricted our analysis of the one-shot game to
duopoly competition on the Hotelling line. Introducing more than two rms, for instance on a
Salop circle (Salop, 1979), would complicate the analysis substantially. However, we conjecture
that introducing more than two rms would not aect the key intuition that bargainers cause
all prices to rise, for the same reasons as given in Section 7.6 in the case of downward-sloping
demand. Note that with many rms on a Salop circle, the softening of competition from higher
list prices would propagate around the circle: if a rm anywhere on the circle raised its list
price, then nearby rms would respond by raising their discount prices; and, anticipating this,
rms further along the circle would raise their discount prices as well. We also conjecture that
the increase in prices caused by bargainers would weaken as the number of rms increased on
a xed Salop circle, since rms would move closer together on the circle, and we know from
Proposition 6 that in the two-rm case a reduction in product dierentiation lowers the gap
between prices with and without bargainers.
7.8 Consumer type independent of location
Our analysis assumes that price takers and bargainers are both uniformly distributed along the
Hotelling line, implying that the ratio of bargainers to price takers is independent of location.
One might consider diering distributions of bargainers and price takers along the Hotelling line
that retain the symmetry around the midpoint so that neither rm is favored. This would imply
that the ratio of bargainers to price takers would vary along the Hotelling line. In any symmetric
equilibrium, the key characteristic of a consumer density function is the density at the midpoint.
In the standard Hotelling paradigm, for example, if consumers are distributed according to
the density function h (x), supported on [0; 1] and symmetric so that h (x) = h (1  x), then
equilibrium prices would be c + t=h(12) (Shilony, 1981). Hence, non-uniform distributions of
consumers can either raise or lower equilibrium prices.
As a result, when bargainers are distributed dierently to price takers along the Hotelling
line in the one-shot game, we conjecture that the presence of bargainers would have two eects.
First, the strategic link between list prices and discount price oers would continue to create
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an incentive for the rms to push up their list prices in order to soften competition at the
discount stage. Furthermore, the strategic link between list prices and discount prices would
operate through those bargainers away from the midpoint who are indierent between one
rm's discount price and the other rm's list price: depending on the relative density of such
bargainers, the strategic link would have a bigger or smaller eect on prices. Second, as noted
above, introducing diering consumer distributions would create a dierence in the equilibrium
prices that the rms would set for the two groups in the absence of any strategic link. This in
turn would inuence the equilibrium list and discount prices.
Our analysis of collusion abstracted from product dierentiation entirely, and so it does not
make sense to allow the ratio of bargainers to price takers to vary with location.
7.9 Stochastic discounting as price discrimination
Proposition 3 delivers the result that in the one-shot game, compared to the benchmark with
only price takers, the presence of bargainers raises all prices and prots, while lowering consumer
surplus and total welfare. Proposition 11 further demonstrates that in the repeated game,
collusion is easier to sustain when bargainers are present than in the benchmark with only price
takers. Thus, the ability of the rms to deliver discounts damages competition in both the static
and dynamic variants of the model. We can interpret the ability to oer stochastic discounts
to bargainers, while excluding price takers from the opportunity to receive the discounts, as a
form of price discrimination. Viewed in this light, we can interpret our results as saying that
banning price discrimination, and so preventing the rms from oering stochastic discounts to
a subset of consumers, is welfare improving in the context of our model.
These insights are complementary to the existing research on competitive price discrimina-
tion. Our model is close to the paradigm of competitive third-degree price discrimination (see
Stole, 2007), since the rms can oer a discount price that only a subset of the consumers (the
bargainers) can receive. However, our model maintains an important strategic dierence: dis-
counts cannot be delivered to the bargainers with certainty, and so the competition for the two
types of consumer are linked even under price discrimination.
Thisse and Vives (1988) study price competition when the rms can price discriminate
perfectly according to observable location. They show that such price discrimination leads
to price reductions at all points on the Hotelling line, and as a result price discrimination
enhances consumer welfare. When symmetric rms sell to two markets with dierent demand
characteristics, Holmes (1989) demonstrates that competitive price discrimination causes prices
to rise in the `strong' market, and fall in the `weak', leading to welfare predictions that depend
upon the relative curvature of the demand functions in each market. When rms are asymmetric,
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and so dier according to the market segments in which they are strong (such as in a Hotelling
model where a consumer is local to one seller, and distant to the other), Corts (1998) shows that
competitive price discrimination can raise all prices or lower all prices. Our analysis diers from
all of these because of the strategic link between consumer segments created by the imperfect
delivery of price reductions. It is this strategic interaction that causes all prices to rise when
price discrimination is permitted.
Turning to collusion, prior work has extended Thisse and Vives (1988)'s model of perfect
price discrimination to a dynamic setting. Gupta and Venkatu (2002) demonstrate that allowing
price discrimination according to observable consumer location harms the ability of rms to
collude if punishment is of the traditional grim-trigger form.21 Liu and Serfes (2007) generalize
this analysis by allowing rms to partition the Hotelling line and deliver a single price to each
partition: collusion becomes harder to sustain as the partitioning becomes ner. In these studies,
the ability to price discriminate perfectly makes deviation more attractive than under uniform
pricing and so harms collusion. These analyses dier from ours since they all build upon a
model in which price discrimination lowers rms' prices in the one-shot game. The strategic link
across consumer segments created by imperfect discounting that we have studied reverses these
results: collusion becomes easier to sustain since a deviation in one market (price takers) elicits
a competitive response in the second market (bargainers).
8 Conclusion
Discounts o public list prices are commonplace. In this paper we have developed and analyzed
a model of dynamic price competition between rms when some consumers buy at discount
prices while others buy at list prices. We extend the literature by studying strategically chosen
stochastic discounts in markets with prior list-price-setting competition. We document the eect
of competition in posted prices with stochastic discounts on discount and list prices, prots and
welfare.
We demonstrate that the eect of having a greater proportion of consumers in the population
who receive discounts with some probability is to raise list prices. The main driver behind our
results is the dynamic link between the list prices and subsequent discount prices. Discounts
respond to list price deviations { and the list price will be the competing oer for those consumers
who do not receive the rival's discount price oer, due to failed bargaining or inattention to
coupons. The dynamic nature of the interaction causes the discount prices to become strategic
complements to the list prices.
21If optimal multi-period penal codes can be used, then this conclusion can be reversed (Miklos-Thal, 2008).
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The insights of this model apply in a wide variety of settings. In markets, such as the
automobile market, where some consumers buy at list prices and others may receive bargained
discounts, the predictions are immediate: the greater the proportion of the population who seek
to bargain, the higher list prices will be. Similarly, in the case of couponing: if a large proportion
of consumers are targeted by coupons then the competitive pressure on list prices will be reduced
and these list prices will rise. This results in a welfare loss since misallocation of consumers to
rms results.
We end by discussing briey how our work might open up a debate about optimal policy
towards bargaining and discount coupons in markets. A naive view would argue that since con-
sumers who negotiate reductions o posted prices or use discount coupons pay lower prices than
do price takers, bargaining and discount coupons ought to be encouraged. This was certainly the
view of the United Kingdom's Oce of Fair Trading with regard to the estate agency (realtor)
market: \Greater [...] negotiation by consumers will increase competitive pressures on estate
agents and result in better value for money in terms of both lower prices and higher service qual-
ity [...] We will therefore undertake an information campaign to raise consumer awareness of the
benets [...] of negotiating fee rates." (Oce of Fair Trading, 2004, Section 1.12). However such
a policy recommendation might be counterproductive: in our model, increasing the proportion
of bargainers increases list prices and bargained prices, while reducing welfare. In this light it
is interesting to note that policymakers sometimes do try to limit bargaining: until 2001 the
Rabattgesetz (statute on discounts) and the Zugabeverordnung (regulation governing free gifts
with sales) severely restricted the ability of German retailers to oer discounts o posted prices
(Finger and Schmieder, 2005, Korn, 2007). We hope that our results will encourage further
research into the conditions under which policymakers ought to encourage or restrict bargaining
and discount couponing in consumer markets.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. There is a proportion 1  2 (0; 1) of bargainers; here for simplicity
we normalize this proportion to 1. Let [x][0;1]  max f0;min fx; 1gg, and let
 (yi; yj) = (yi   c)

t+ yj   yi
2t
[0;1]
(4)
represent rm i's prots in the standard Hotelling model when rm i sets a price yi and its rival
sets a price yj (the market share is determined by the indierent consumer at location x that
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solves yi + tx = yj + t(1  x)). Then
rd (pi; pj) = 
2 (pi; pj) (5)
represents rm i's prots from bargainers who receive both discount price oers (the super-
script `rd' represents the fact that these bargainers receive the rival rm's discount price oer).
Similarly,
nrd (pi; lj) =  (1  ) (pi; lj) (6)
represents prots from bargainers who receive only rm i's oer (the superscript `nrd' represents
the fact that these bargainers do not receive the rival rm's discount price oer). Given that
pi aects prots only in these two cases, total prots at the discount stage are given by:
disc (pi; pj ; lj) = (constant) + 
rd (pi; pj) + 
nrd (pi; lj) : (7)
We will use the following denitions extensively, where  functions represent maxima ignoring
the pi  li constraint on rm i's discount price oers, but we restrict attention to discount price
oers and list prices of the rival that satisfy the pj  lj constraint:
rd (pj)  arg max
pi2[c;1)
rd (pi; pj) ;
nrd (lj)  arg max
pi2[c;1)
nrd (pi; lj) ;
disc (pj ; lj)  arg max
pi2[c;1)
disc (pi; pj ; lj) ;
pi  arg max
pi2[c;li]
disc (pi; pj ; lj) :
The strategy of the proof is as follows.
First, Lemmas 1-8 determine the properties of the best-response function pi . Lemma 1
demonstrates that prots at the discount stage disc (pi; pj ; lj) are the sum of two quasi-concave
functions in rm i's discount price pi. Lemma 2 determines the maxima of these constituent
functions, and Lemma 3 notes that the maximum of disc (pi; pj ; lj) must lie between the maxima
of the constituent quasi-concave parts. Lemmas 4-7 determine best responses when the rival's
discount and list prices both lie on the same side of the standard Hotelling price of t + c.
Lemma 4 establishes that the prot function disc (pi; pj ; lj) is strictly concave over the whole
region between the maxima of the constituent quasi-concave parts, which allows us to use rst-
order conditions to determine the best-response discount prices. Lemma 5 does so ignoring the
constraint that discount prices must lie below list prices, Lemma 6 takes the constraint into
account, and Lemma 7 shows that the constraint is not binding for the rm with the higher
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list price if its list price is above t+ c. Finally, Lemma 8 considers the case in which the rival's
discount price is below t+ c with no restrictions on the rival's list price.
Next, Claims 1-3 use these best-response functions to establish the equilibrium discount
prices and conrm there can be no others. We split the problem into three cases: both rms
having set list prices above t+ c (Claim 1); both rms having set list prices below t+ c (Claim
2); and one rm having set a list price above t+ c and the rival below t+ c (Claim 3). Together
these deliver the proof of Proposition 1.
Lemma 1 rd (pi; pj) and 
nrd (pi; lj) are quasi-concave in pi. In particular, 
rd (pi; pj) is
strictly increasing in pi when pi 2 [c; pj   t] (if this range exists), strictly concave in pi when
pi 2 [pj   t; pj + t] and equal to 0 when pi 2 [pj + t;1); and similarly for nrd (pi; lj) :
Proof. Immediate from (5) and (6), given that (t+ pj   pi) =2t  1, pi  pj t and  2 (0; 1) :
Lemma 2 (i) rd (pj) =
1
2 (pj + t+ c) 2 (pj   t; pj + t) ; (ii) nrd (lj) = 12 (lj + t+ c) 2 (lj   t; lj + t) ;
and (iii) rd (pj)  nrd (lj) :
Proof. (pi   c) (t+ pj   pi) =2t is strictly concave in pi and maximized at 12 (pj + t+ c)  c;
given that pj  c: Therefore, using (5) and Lemma 1, rd (pj) = 12 (pj + t+ c) ; if we can
show that 12 (pj + t+ c) 2 (pj   t; pj + t) : We show that this condition holds, in two steps.
First, 12 (pj + t+ c) < pj + t , c < pj + t; which holds given pj  c and t > 0: Second,
1
2 (pj + t+ c) > pj   t, 3t+ c > pj ; which holds given pj  lj  2t+ c < 3t+ c. An analogous
argument gives (ii), and (iii) then follows from pj  lj :
Lemma 3 disc (pj ; lj) 2

rd (pj) ; 
nrd (lj)

:
Proof. Immediate given that rd and nrd are quasi-concave (Lemma 1) and that each has a
unique arg max (Lemma 2).
Lemma 4 If pj  t + c or lj < t + c; then (i)

rd (pj) ; 
nrd (lj)
  [pj   t; pj + t] and (ii)
rd (pj) ; 
nrd (lj)
  [lj   t; lj + t] ; and so disc (pi; pj ; lj) is strictly concave in pi when pi 2
rd (pj) ; 
nrd (lj)

:
Proof. From Lemma 2, rd (pj) =
1
2 (pj + t+ c) > pj   t and nrd (lj) = 12 (lj + t+ c) < lj + t:
Furthermore:
(i) 12 (lj + t+ c)  pj+ t, lj  2pj+ t c; and (ii) 12 (pj + t+ c)  lj  t, pj+3t+c  2lj :
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In both cases, the inequality holds when pj  t+c given lj  2t+c; and holds when lj < t+c
given pj  c: From Lemma 1, (5) is strictly concave in pi when pi 2 [pj   t; pj + t] and (6) is
strictly concave in pi when pi 2 [lj   t; lj + t]. Thus, disc (pi; pj ; lj) ; given by (7), is the sum of
two strictly concave functions, and so strictly concave in pi; when pi 2

rd (pj) ; 
nrd (lj)

:
Lemma 5 If pj  t+ c or lj < t+ c; then disc (pj ; lj) = 12 [t+ c+ (1  ) lj + pj ] :
Proof. From Lemma 3, disc (pj ; lj) 2

rd (pj) ; 
nrd (lj)

: If pj  t + c or lj < t + c, from
Lemma 4, (7) is strictly concave in pi when pi 2

rd (pj) ; 
nrd (lj)

: The rst-order condition,
2

(pi   c) ( 1) + (t+ pj   pi)
2t

+  (1  )

(pi   c) ( 1) + (t+ lj   pi)
2t

= 0;
is satised at pi =
1
2 [t+ c+ (1  ) lj + pj ] : Furthermore using Lemma 2, 12 [t+ c+ (1  ) lj + pj ] 2
rd (pj) ; 
nrd (lj)

; giving the result.
Lemma 6 If pj  t+ c or lj < t+ c; then pi = min

1
2 [t+ c+ (1  ) lj + pj ] ; li
	
:
Proof. From Lemmas 1 and 2, (7) is strictly increasing in pi when pi 2 [c; rd (pj)): From
Lemmas 3 and 4, (7) is strictly increasing in pi when pi 2 [rd (pj) ; disc (pj ; lj)); if this range
exists. Thus, when li < 
disc (pj ; lj), p

i = li; which together with Lemma 5 gives the result.
Lemma 7 If l1  t+ c and either p2  t+ c or l2 < t+ c; then p1 = 12 [t+ c+ (1  ) l2 + p2] ;
i.e., rm 1's best response is not constrained by its list price.
Proof. Given that l1  l2  p2 and that l1  t + c; 2l1  t + c + (1  ) l2 + p2; and so
l1  12 [t+ c+ (1  ) l2 + p2] : The result then follows from Lemma 6.
Lemma 8
(i) If pj < t+ c and li > pj ; then p

i > pj :
(ii) If pj < t+ c and li  pj ; then pi = li:
Proof. From Lemma 2, rd (pj) =
1
2 (pj + t+ c) > pj given pj < t+ c: From Lemmas 1 and 2,
(7) is strictly increasing in pi when pi 2 [c; rd (pj)); and so pi > pj when li > pj and pi = li
when li  pj :
We now complete the proof of Proposition 1 by splitting the list-price space l1; l2 2 [c; 2t+ c]
into three regions.
Claim 1 When l1  l2  t+ c; (i) there is a unique pure-strategy equilibrium in which p1; p2 
t+ c; given by (p1; p2) in Proposition 1, and (ii) there are no other pure-strategy equilibria.
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Proof. (i) For p1; p2  t + c; the best-response functions are given in Lemma 6. The un-
constrained best-response functions 12 [t+ c+ (1  ) l2 + p2] and 12 [t+ c+ (1  ) l1 + p1]
intersect at
bp1 = 1
2   (t+ c) +

1  1
2  

2l2 + l1
2 + 

and
bp2 = 1
2   (t+ c) +

1  1
2  

2l1 + l2
2 + 

: (8)
Given l1  l2  t + c, 2l1 + l2  2l2 + l1  (2 + ) (t+ c) ; and so bp1; bp2  t + c: By Lemma
7, only rm 20s list-price constraint is relevant. Thus, (p1; p2) = (bp1; bp2) when bp2  l2; and
(p1; p2) =
 
1
2 (t+ c+ l2) ; l2

when bp2 > l2; substituting p2 = l2 into p1 from Lemma 7. Recalling
that l2  t + c; we conrm that p1; p2  t + c when bp2 > l2. The equilibrium corresponds to
(p1; p2) in Proposition 1, since min

1
2 (t+ c+ l2) ; l1
	
= 12 (t+ c+ l2) here.
(ii) Suppose there is an equilibrium in which pi ; p

j < t+ c: Given min fli; ljg  t+ c, we can
apply Lemma 8(i) to show that pi > p

j > p

i ; a contradiction. Suppose there is an equilibrium
in which pj  t+c > pi : Given min fli; ljg  t+c, min
n
1
2
h
t+ c+ (1  ) lj + pj
i
; li
o
 t+c;
and so by Lemma 6 pi  t+ c; a contradiction.
Claim 2 When t+ c > l1  l2; there is a unique pure-strategy equilibrium, given by (p1; p2) in
Proposition 1.
Proof. Given t + c > l1  l2, the best-response functions are given by Lemma 6. The un-
constrained best-response functions 12 [t+ c+ (1  ) l2 + p2] and 12 [t+ c+ (1  ) l1 + p1]
intersect at (bp1; bp2) given in (8). Once rm i's list-price constraint binds, i's best-response func-
tion becomes at, and so the best-response functions intersect a single time with the intersection
weakly to the south-west of (bp1; bp2) ; giving a unique equilibrium.
Note that bp2 > l2; given that t + c > l2 and 2l1 + l2  (2 + ) l2: Thus, at least one
constraint must bind. We cannot have p1 = l1 < t + c and p2 < l2; since then from Lemma
6, p2 =
1
2 (t+ c+ l1) < l2; a contradiction given l1  l2 and t + c > l2; instead, we must have
p2 = l2; and therefore p1 = min

1
2 (t+ c+ l2) ; l1
	
:
Claim 3 When l1  t+ c > l2; there is a unique pure-strategy equilibrium, given by (p1; p2) in
Proposition 1.
Proof. Suppose rst that there is an equilibrium with p2 = l2. Given l1  t+ c > l2, by Lemma
7, p1 =
1
2 (t+ c+ l2) ; and therefore p

1 < t + c and l2 < p

1. Thus, Lemma 8(ii) shows that
p2 = l2; and hence we have an equilibrium at (p1; p2) =
 
1
2 (t+ c+ l2) ; l2

: This corresponds
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to (p1; p2) in Proposition 1, since bp2 > l2 (given (8), t + c > l2 and 2l1 + l2 > (2 + ) l2), and
min

1
2 (t+ c+ l2) ; l1
	
= 12 (t+ c+ l2) here.
There are no other equilibria. The only candidates have p2 < l2: Suppose such an equilibrium
exists. Given l1  t+c > l2, p2 < t+c and l1 > p2; and so we can apply Lemma 8(i) to show that
p1 > p2: Suppose rst that p1 < t+ c: We can apply Lemma 8 to show that p2 > p1 or p2 = l2,
either of which gives a contradiction. Suppose second that p1  t + c: Given l1  t + c > l2,
min

1
2 [t+ c+ (1  ) l1 + p1] ; l2
	
= l2; and so by Lemma 6 p

2 = l2; a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2. From Proposition 1, there exists a unique pure-strategy Nash equi-
librium at the discount stage given by (p1; p2). These discount prices are themselves functions
of the list prices fli; ljg set in the rst stage. Recalling (4), prots at the list-price-setting stage
are given by
listi
 
li; lj ; p

i ; p

j

=
h
+ (1  ) (1  )2
i
 (li; lj)
+ (1  ) (1  ) (pi ; lj)
+ (1  ) (1  ) (li; pj )
+ (1  )2 (pi ; pj ): (9)
We add the subscript `i' to denote the rm's identity, since for notational convenience we exclude
the arguments of listi in the remainder of the proof. The rst line gives rm i's prots from the
proportion  of price takers, and from the bargainers who receive neither discount price oer.
The second (third) line gives prot from the bargainers who receive only rm i's (rm j's) oer.
The nal line gives prots from the bargainers who receive both oers.
The strategy of the proof is as follows. First, Lemma 9 establishes that the discount prices
are continuous functions of the list prices, thus demonstrating that each rm's rst-stage payo
function, listi , is continuous in its own list price li. Claim 4 demonstrates that, starting from
symmetric list prices above the standard Hotelling level of t + c, listi is locally concave in li.
This allows us to characterize a unique candidate equilibrium, given by (2) in the statement of
Claim 4. Finally, Claim 5 establishes existence of this candidate equilibrium by showing that
listi is concave on a number of distinct ranges, and then using the continuity from Lemma 9 to
stitch these ranges together to show global quasi-concavity of the payo function.
Lemma 9 listi is continuous in the rm's own list price li:
Proof. (9) is clearly continuous in pi , p

j and the direct eect of li: We also need to show
continuity in the indirect eect of li via the discount prices p

i and p

j : First, we show continuity
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of pi and p

j in li for li  lj : We need to show that (p1; p2) in Proposition 1 are continuous in l1:
Clearly, we have continuity within case 1 and within case 2. As we move from case 1 to case 2,
p2 changes continuously. From Claims 1-3, it is always the case that either p2  t+c or l2 < t+c
in equilibrium; thus, using Lemma 6, p1 is also continuous given that p2 is continuous. Second,
we show continuity of pi and p

j in li for li  lj : We need to show that (p1; p2) in Proposition 1
are continuous in l2: Again, p

2 is clearly continuous, and therefore p

1 is also continuous by the
same argument as above for the rst range. We have shown continuity on two ranges that share
a common boundary, and so we have continuity on the union of those ranges.
Claim 4 Any symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium at the list-price-setting stage in which
l 2 [c; 2t+ c] and l 6= t+ c must be given by l = (2) 2 (t+ c; 2t+ c) in Proposition 2.
Proof. First, we consider l 2 (t+ c; 2t+ c]: At l > t+ c; using Proposition 1 and Corollary 1,
pi and p

j are given by case 1 with
pi = p

j =
1
2   (t+ c) +

1  1
2  

l 2 (t+ c; l) :
For small deviations, pi and p

j continue to be given by case 1 in Proposition 1, with
dpi
dli
=
 (1  )
4  2 and
dpj
dli
=
2 (1  )
4  2 : (10)
Thus, referring back to (9), we are in the interior at l 2 (t + c; 2t + c], since jlj   lij < t;
jlj   pi j < t;
pj   li < t and pj   pi  < t, and we remain in the interior for small deviations
in li. Locally, the rst derivative is thus given by:
2t
dlisti
dli
=
h
+ (1  ) (1  )2
i
(t+ lj   2li + c)
+ (1  ) (1  ) (t+ lj   2pi + c)
dpi
dli
+ (1  ) (1  )
 
t+ pj   2li + c

+ (li   c)
dpj
dli

+ (1  )2
 
t+ pj   2pi + c
 dpi
dli
+ (pi   c)
dpj
dli

: (11)
Furthermore, listi is locally strictly concave in li. Using (10) and (11), some algebra gives:
2t
d2listi
d (li)
2 =  2  2 (1  ) (1  )

3   8 + 16
(4  2)2

< 0:
Substituting (10) into the rst-order condition given by setting (11) = 0; and then solving for
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l; gives (2). We can check that (2) 2 (t+ c; 2t+ c) : For all  2 (0; 1) ;
t+c < (2) < (t+ c)+ t

(2  )
(4  2 + 2)

= (t+ c)+ t

(2  )
(4  4 + 22) + (2  )

< (t+ c)+ t:
(2) is our unique candidate equilibrium in which l 2 (t + c; 2t + c): At l = li = lj = 2t + c;
upward deviations are not permitted, given li  2t+ c. Thus, we need to check that (11) < 0, to
ensure that there is an incentive to deviate downward. By inspection, (11) is linear in l = li = lj
and is strictly positive for l = li = lj close enough to t + c (so that p

i = p

j are close to t + c).
Furthermore, from above (11) = 0 at l = (2) < 2t+ c, and so (11) < 0 at l = li = lj = 2t+ c:
Second, we consider l < t+ c: Using Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, pi and p

j are given by
case 2 with pi = p

j = l
: Consider a small upward deviation to l1 = l + ": From Proposition
1, we remain in case 2, p2 remains unchanged at l; and p1 rises to l1 = l + " <
1
2 (t+ c+ l
) :
Thus, given l < t+c and so l lies below the standard Hotelling equilibrium level, the deviation
is strictly protable for the same reason as in the standard Hotelling model, yielding the desired
contradiction.
Claim 5 The candidate symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium at the list-price-setting stage
given by l = (2) 2 (t+ c; 2t+ c) in Proposition 2 exists.
Proof. Given l > t + c; using Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, pi and p

j are given by case 1
with
pi = p

j =
1
2   (t+ c) +

1  1
2  

l 2 (t+ c; l) : (12)
Given l < 2t + c, and referring back to (9), we are in the interior at l, since jlj   lij < t;
jlj   pi j < t;
pj   li < t and pj   pi  < t: We prove existence by showing that when lj = l;
listi is quasi-concave in li with a maximum at l
; and so there is no incentive to deviate.
(i) First, consider upward deviations to l1 > l
: Let el1 solve
1
2   (t+ c) +

1  1
2  

2l1 + l

2 + 

= l: (13)
From (12), the left-hand side of (13) < l at l1 = l, and so el1 > l.
(i)(a) When l1 2
h
l; el1i ; p1 and p2 are given by case 1 in Proposition 1. We remain in the
interior, given that 2t+ c  li  pi, that p1 and p2 are increasing in l1 from Proposition 1, and
that pi ; p

j > t+ c at l1 = l
 from (12). Given that we remain in the interior, the proof of Claim
4 thus shows that list1 is strictly concave in l1 with a maximum at l
; noting that (10) holds for
all l1 2
h
l; el1i since we are in case 1, and so (11) is linear in l1.
(i)(b) When l1 > el1; p1 and p2 are given by case 2 in Proposition 1, and so p1 = 12 (t+ c+ l) <
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l1 and p

2 = l
: Again, we remain in the interior, since pi ; p

j > t+ c. Thus, using (9),
list1 = (constant) +
h
+ (1  ) (1  )2 + (1  ) (1  )
i
(l1   c)

t+ l   l1
2t

;
which is strictly concave in l1 and maximized at
1
2 (t+ c+ l
) < el1; given 12 (t+ c+ l) < l and
l < el1 from above.
(i)(c) Using (i)(a), (i)(b) and the continuity of listi from Lemma 9, 
list
1 is quasi-concave in
l1 when l1  l; with a maximum at l; and so there is no incentive to deviate upward.
(ii) Second, consider downward deviations to l2 < l
: Let el2 solve
1
2   (t+ c) +

1  1
2  

2l + l2
2 + 

= l2;
which gives el2 = 2 + 
4  

(t+ c) +

1  2 + 
4  

l 2 (t+ c; l) : (14)
Note further that el2 2 l   t; t+ c+ l
2

; (15)
since el2 > l   t given el2 > t + c from (14) and t + c > l   t from (2), and el2 < 12 (t+ c+ l)
using (14), l > t+ c and 2+4  >
1
2 .
(ii)(a) When l2 2
hel2; li ; p1 and p2 are given by case 1 in Proposition 1. Note that pi ; pj >
t + c at l2 = el2; since el2 > t + c from (14) and so 2el2 + l > (2 + ) (t+ c) : Given that
2t+ c  li  pi, that p1 and p2 are increasing in l2 from Proposition 1, and that pi ; pj > t+ c at
l2 = el2, we remain in the interior. An analogous argument to that in case (i)(a) above therefore
shows that list2 is strictly concave in l2 with a maximum at l
.
(ii)(b) When l2 2

l   t; el2 ; p1 and p2 are given by case 2 in Proposition 1, and so
p1 =
1
2 (t+ c+ l2) < l
 and p2 = l2: We remain in the interior, since
1
2 (t+ c+ l2)  l2
 =1
2 (t+ c  l2)
 < t (given that c  l2 < l < 2t+ c) and jl   l2j < t here. Thus, using (9),
list2 =
h
+ (1  ) (1  )2 + (1  ) (1  )
i
(l2   c)

t+ l   l2
2t

+

(1  ) (1  ) + (1  )2 (l2   c) t+ 12 (t+ c+ l2)  l2
2t
!
: (16)
The rst line of (16) is strictly concave and maximized at 12 (t+ c+ l
) ; but 12 (t+ c+ l
) >el2 from (15). The second line of (16) is strictly concave and maximized at 12 (3t+ 2c) ; but
1
2 (3t+ 2c) >
el2 since 12 (3t+ 2c) > 12 (t+ c+ l) (given that 2t+ c > l) and 12 (t+ c+ l) > el2
from (15). Summing together, list2 is strictly concave in l2 with a maximum strictly greater
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than el2:
(ii)(c) When l2  l t; recalling that el2 > l t from (15), all the analysis in (ii)(b) continues
to apply, except that l  l2  t; and so (l2   c) (t+ l   l2) =2t in the rst line of (16) is replaced
by (l2   c) since market shares are bounded at 1. Summing a linearly increasing function and
a strictly concave function with a maximum above el2, it continues to be the case that list2 is
strictly concave in l2 with a maximum strictly greater than el2; and so strictly greater than l  t:
(ii)(d) Using (ii)(a), (ii)(b) and (ii)(c) and the continuity of list2 from Lemma 9, 
list
2 is
quasi-concave in l2 when l2  l; with a maximum at l; and so there is no incentive to deviate
downward.
Proof of Remark 1. From Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, at l = t + c; pi = p

j = t + c = l;
and so all prices are the same as in the standard Hotelling model. Upward deviations to l1 > l
give p1 =
1
2 (t+ c+ l) = l < l1 and p

2 = l (case 2 in Proposition 1), and so discount price oers
do not change. Thus, the deviation is not protable for the same reason as in the standard
Hotelling model. Downward deviations to l2 < l give p

1 =
1
2 (t+ c+ l2) < l and p

2 = l2 (again
case 2 in Proposition 1, since bp2 from (8) falls less fast than l2 does). Given downward deviations
induce a competitive response by the rival for some of the customers, they are less protable
than in the standard Hotelling model, and so they are not protable since they are not in the
standard Hotelling model.
Proof of Proposition 3. From (2) and (3),
p = (t+ c) + t
24 2 (1  )2 

1 

(4  2) (2  ) + 2 (1  ) (4  2 + 2)
35 : (17)
In the benchmark with only price takers, l = t + c: From (2) and (17), l > t + c and p > t + c
given  2 (0; 1) ;  2 (0; 1) and t > 0: Since the market is covered, every consumer buys at a
price above t + c; thus each rm's prots are strictly higher than in the benchmark given the
equilibrium is symmetric. Since the market is covered, total welfare falls linearly in transport
costs T: Transport costs are given by:
T =
n
+ (1  )
h
(1  )2 + 2
io t
4

+ (1  ) 2 (1  )
 Z 1
2
+ l p
2t
0
txdx+
Z 1
1
2
+ l p
2t
t (1  x) dx
!
:
The rst line captures the average transport cost of those who choose between two equal prices.
The second line captures the transport cost of the bargainers who receive only one discount price
oer. Note that 12 +
l p
2t 2 (0; 1), since the equilibrium is interior from the proof of Claim 5.
38
Integrating gives:
T =
n
+ (1  )
h
(1  )2 + 2
io t
4

+ (1  ) 2 (1  )
"
t
4
+ t

l   p
2t
2#
=
t
4
+ (1  ) (1  ) (l   p)
2
2t
: (18)
Using (2) and (17), l   p > 0. Thus, T is strictly higher than the benchmark level of t=4; and
hence total welfare is strictly lower. Finally, since total welfare is strictly lower and prots are
strictly higher, consumer surplus must be strictly lower.
Proof of Proposition 4. The proportion of bargainers rises as the proportion  of price
takers falls. Let
g    4  2 (2  ) + 2 (1  ) (1  )  4  2 + 2 .
Given  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; 1), g > 0. Using (2),
dl
d
=  2 (1  ) (2  )2  4  2  tg 2 < 0; (19)
d2l
d2
= 42 (1  ) (2  )2  4  2 32 + 8 (1  )  tg 3 > 0. (20)
(19) gives (i), while the convexity of list prices shown in (20) implies that the list prices rise at
an increasing rate. Using (3), (19) and (20),
dp
d
=

1  
2  

dl
d
< 0 and
d2p
d2
=

1  
2  

d2l
d2
> 0; (21)
hence (ii) holds and the discount price oers rise at an increasing rate. Finally, using (2), (3),
(19) and (20),
d (l   p)
d
=
d
d

1
2   [l   (t+ c)]

=

1
2  

dl
d
< 0; (22)
d2 (l   p)
d2
=

1
2  

d2l
d2
> 0. (23)
Therefore (iii) holds and the dierence rises at an increasing rate.
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Proof of Proposition 5. (i) Let q 

l (t+c)
t
 1
: Using (2):
q =
1
2


1  
  
4  2
(1  ) +
 
4  2 + 2
(2  ) ;
@q
@
=
1
2


1  
   4 + 8   2
(1  )2 2 +
 8 (1  )
(2  )2 2 ; (24)
@2q
@2
=


1  
 
4  12 (1  )  3
(1  )3 3 +
8 [4  3 (1  )  3]
(2  )3 3 > 0:
Note that @
2q
@2
> 0; since  (1  )  1=4; that lim#0 @q@ =  1, since both terms in (24) tend
to  1; and that lim"1 @q@ = +1; since the rst term in (24) tends to +1 and the second to 0:
Thus, q is strictly convex in  with a trough at e 2 (0; 1) ; and hence q is strictly quasi-convex
in . Since q > 0, it follows that q 1 is strictly quasi-concave in  with a peak at e 2 (0; 1) (see,
e.g., Floudas, 1995, Section 2.3.2(iii)). Thus, l = q 1t + (t+ c) is also strictly quasi-concave
in  with a peak at e 2 (0; 1). Note that e > 4   2p3; since the rst term in (24) = 0 at
 = 4 2p3 ' 0:54 (the unique root of  4+8 2 in (0; 1)), while the second term is negative
for all  2 (0; 1) ; and so @q@ < 0 for all  2 (0; 4  2
p
3]:
(ii) Let r 

p (t+c)
t
 1
: Using (17):
r =
1
2


1  
  
4  2 (2  )
(1  )2  +
 
4  2 + 2
(1  ) ;
@r
@
=


1  
   4 + 12   52
(1  )3 2 +
  4 + 8   2
(1  )2 2 ; (25)
@2r
@2
=


1  
 
8  32 (1  ) + 152 (1  ) + 2
(1  )4 3 +
2

4  12 (1  )  3
(1  )3 3 > 0:
By a similar argument to that in part (i), p is strictly quasi-concave in  with a peak atee 2 (0; 1) : The only dierence is that both terms in (25) tend to +1 as  tends to 1. Note thatee 2  25 ; 4  2p3 ; since the rst term in (25) = 0 at  = 2=5 (the unique root of  4+12 52
in (0; 1)), while the second term in (25) = 0 at  = 4  2p3 (the unique root of  4+ 8  2 in
(0; 1)), and so @r@ < 0 for all  2 (0; 25 ] and @r@ > 0 for all  2 [4  2
p
3; 1). Thus,
ee < e; sincee > 4  2p3 from part (i).
(iii) Let
M 


1  
 
4  2 (2  ) + 2 (1  )  4  2 + 2 > 0; (26)
A   23   6   33+ 4 :
Using (2) and (17):
l   p = 2t (1  )
M
: (27)
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After some manipulation, we can show that
(1  2)M    (1  ) @M
@
=
(2  )
(1  )A;
which in turn gives
d (l   p)
d
=
2t (2  )
M2 (1  )A: (28)
Note that 2t(2 )
M2(1 ) > 0; and so (28) shares the same sign as A: At  = 0; A = 4 > 0: At  = 1;
A =  3 < 0: Furthermore,
@A
@
=  6  1  2  92 < 0:
Thus, there is a
eee 2 (0; 1) such that A > 0 when  < eee and A < 0 when  > eee: Since the sign
of (28) matches that of A; this implies that l   p is strictly quasi-concave in  with a peak ateee 2 (0; 1) :
Proof of Proposition 6. From (2), @l=@t > 1: From (17), @p=@t > 1: Using (26) and (27),
@ (l   p) =@t > 0: In the benchmark with only price takers, l = t+ c; and so @l=@t = 1:
Proof of Proposition 7. Recall that, since the market is covered, welfare falls linearly in
transport costs T: Dierentiating (18),
dT
d
=
 (1  )
t
"
 (l   p)
2
2
+ (1  ) (l   p) d (l   p)
d
#
;
d2T
d2
=
 (1  )
t

 2 (l   p) + (1  ) d (l   p)
d

d (l   p)
d
+ (1  ) (l   p) d
2 (l   p)
d2

:
From (26) and (27), l   p > 0. Thus, using (22), dT=d < 0, and so total welfare falls in the
proportion of bargainers. Using (22) and (23), d2T=d2 > 0, and so total welfare falls at an
increasing rate.
Proof of Proposition 8. Recall that, since the market is covered, welfare falls linearly in
transport costs T: Using (18), (26) and (27):
T =
t
4
+
2t (1  )3 (1  )3
M2
: (29)
Let
B  24  60 + 422   63 +   8   242 + 73 :
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After some manipulation, we can show that
(1  )

3 (1  2)M   2 (1  ) @M
@

= B;
which in turn gives
dT
d
=
2t2 (1  )2
M3
B: (30)
Note that 2t
2(1 )2
M3
> 0; and so (30) shares the same sign as B: At  = 0; B = 24 > 0: At
 = 1; B =  9 < 0: Furthermore,
@2B
@2
= 6 (14  6   8+ 7) > 0:
Thus, there is a  2 (0; 1) such that B > 0 when  <  and B < 0 when  > : Since the
sign of (30) matches that of B; this implies that T is strictly quasi-concave in  with a peak at
 2 (0; 1) : Thus, welfare is strictly quasi-convex in  with a trough at  2 (0; 1) :
Proof of Proposition 9. Using (9), and noting that 12 +
l p
2t 2 (0; 1) and 12   l p2t 2 (0; 1)
(since the equilibrium is interior from the proof of Claim 5), each rm's prots are given by
 =
1
2
[+ (1  )] (l   c) + 1
2
(1  ) (p  c)  1
2
(1  ) (1  )t 1 (l   p)2 , and
d
d
=
1
2
 (l   c) + 1
2
[+ (1  )] dl
d
  1
2
 (p  c) + 1
2
(1  ) dp
d
+
1
2
(1  )t 1 (l   p)2   (1  ) (1  )t 1 (l   p) d (l   p)
d
.
Using (2), (3), (19), (21) and (22), and after some manipulation,
d
d
dl
d
=
1
2
+

1  
2  


2
8>>><>>>:1 
24+ (1  ) (2  2)  4  2 + 2
(2  ) (4  2) + 2| {z }
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(i)

1 + (1  )

l   p
t
9>>>=>>>; .
Note (i) > 0 and, from (26) and (27), l pt > 0. Since 2   > 2  2 and 4  2 > 4  2 + 2;
(i) < 3: From (3), l  p = l (t+c)2  , and hence using (2) l pt < 4 2+2 : Thus we can determine a
bound:
d
d
dl
d
>
1
2
+

1  
2  


2

 2  3 (1  )
(4  2 + 2)

=
8  16 + 52 +   8     2
2 (2  ) (4  2 + 2) . (31)
Now (31) > 0 for any  > 0 if 8   16 + 52 > 0; which in turn requires  <  8  2p6 =5 '
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0:6202. From (19) dl=d < 0; and so for  2  0;  8  2p6 =5 we have d=d < 0, and hence
prots increase in the proportion of bargainers. From Proposition 7, total welfare always falls
in the proportion of bargainers, and hence consumer surplus falls when prots increase.
Proof of Proposition 10. Using (9), and noting that 12 +
l p
2t 2 (0; 1) and 12   l p2t 2 (0; 1)
(since the equilibrium is interior from the proof of Claim 5), each rm's prots are given by:
 = (l   p)
24+ (1  ) (1  )2
2
+ (1  ) (1  )

1
2
  l   p
2t

| {z }
35
(a)
+
p  c
2
: (32)
Using (26) and (27), l p2t is independent of t: From the proof of Proposition 6, @ (l   p) =@t > 0
and @p=@t > 1. Thus, @=@t > 12 ; since (a) > 0 given
1
2  l p2t > 0 from above. In the benchmark
with only price takers,
 =
1
2
(l   c) = 1
2
(t+ c  c) = 1
2
t; (33)
and so @=@t = 12 :
Recall that, since the market is covered, welfare falls linearly in transport costs T: Using (26)
and (29), @T=@t > 14 . In the benchmark with only price takers, T =
1
4 t; and so @T=@t =
1
4 :
Since the market is covered, consumer surplus falls linearly in T +2: From above, T and 
rise faster than in the benchmark, and so consumer surplus falls faster than in the benchmark.
Proof of Proposition 11. Lemmas 10 and 11 establish equilibrium behavior when the two-
stage game is played only once. Claim 6 then completes the proof, recalling Section 6.2, which
describes the equilibrium concept and o-equilibrium punishments.
Lemma 10 Suppose that the list prices are given by flj : j 2 f1; 2; :::; Ngg and suppose that
n  1 rms, including rm i, set the lowest list price l  min fljg > c. Then there is a unique
symmetric Nash equilibrium of the discount stage, in which all rms oer prices
p 2  (1  )N 1(l   c) + c ; l 
drawn from the distribution22
F (p) =
1

 

1  


l   c
p  c
 1
N 1
: (34)
22It makes no dierence to the analysis whether (i) for every bargainer a rm draws a price from the pricing
distribution or (ii) a rm draws a single price from the pricing distribution, which it then oers to all bargainers.
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Firm i makes expected prots from the bargainers of:
i = (li   c) (1  )N 1

1  
n
+ 

:
Proof. We start by showing that any symmetric equilibrium must be mixed with: (i) F (l) = 1;
(ii) no mass points in the density function; and (iii) F (p) < 1 for p < l.
(i) Recall from Section 3 that pi  li, and by assumption rm i is one of the n  1 rms
setting the lowest list price l, so pi  l. Thus, in a symmetric equilibrium F (l) = 1.
(ii) If there were a mass point at price p > c, a rm could deviate protably by lowering
its discount price to p   " just below the mass point whenever it would have oered p. This
increases sales by a discrete amount (when the bargainer also receives an oer of p from a rival
rm and receives no lower oers) in return for a vanishingly small loss and so is a protable
deviation. If there were a mass point at p  c, a rm would deviate upward to sell at a strictly
positive prot to bargainers who receive its oer and not any of the rivals'.
(iii) Suppose that the support of F is bounded above at p < l. From (ii), the probability that
any of the rival rms oers this highest price to the bargainers is zero. Thus any rm oering
the highest discount price could deviate protably by raising price towards l since the rm will
continue to sell at the oered price if and only if the bargainer receives its oer and not any of
the rivals'.23
Now suppose that rm i oers a discount price p < l, and the rival rms draw their discount
prices from the same distribution F . If a bargainer does not receive rm i's oer, then the rm
sells at li with probability 1=n when the bargainer also fails to receive any of the other rms'
oers. If, instead, a bargainer does receive the oer, then the rm sells at p when p is below any
other oers received by the bargainer. The probability that a bargainer receives k of the N   1
rival rms' oers is
k (1  )N 1 k
0@ N   1
k
1A
where the binomial coecient counts the number of (unordered) combinations of k rivals that
can be constructed out of a set of N   1. Combining, we can write rm i's expected prot from
the bargainers at any oered price p < li as
i (p) = (li   c) (1  )N 1
n
+ (p  c)
N 1X
k=0
k (1  )N 1 k
0@ N   1
k
1A (1  F (p))k :
23Even if the density is zero at the highest price in the support of the distribution, by continuity prot at this
price must be the same as for prices in the interior of the mixing distribution.
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Using the Binomial Theorem (e.g., Kreyszig, 1993, p. 1165), we have
i (p) = (li   c) (1  )N 1
n
+ (p  c) [1   +  (1  F (p))]N 1
= (li   c) (1  )N 1
n
+ (p  c) (1  F (p))N 1 : (35)
For rm i to be willing to randomize, its prot must be constant at all points in the support of
F . To nd i, we consider rm i's prot from setting a price which tends to the upper bound
of the support of F , that is li = l:
i = lim
p"li
i (p) = (li   c) (1  )N 1
n
+ (li   c) (1  )N 1 (36)
= (li   c) (1  )N 1

1  
n
+ 

:
Equating (35) and (36) yields
li   c
p  c

(1  )N 1 = (1  F (p))N 1 :
This can be solved to yield (34). The lower bound of the support p can then be determined by
setting F
 
p

= 0:
Clearly, rm i has no incentive to deviate downward from p: from (ii) there can't be a mass
point at p, so the rm would continue to sell to the same proportion of bargainers. It is readily
conrmed that any rm j whose list price is above l has the same pricing distribution since the
prot for such a rm j is the same as for rm i, except that rm j makes no prot when its
oer is not received. We also have to check that such a rm j has no incentive to deviate to
pj 2 [l; lj ]: at pj = l the rm would sell to only 1= (n+ 1) of the bargainers who receive only its
oer; at pj > l the rm would fail to sell to any of the bargainers when its oer is received.
Lemma 11 The unique symmetric pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium of the one-shot two-stage
game has all prices at marginal cost and prots of zero.
Proof. Suppose rst that there is a symmetric equilibrium with list prices l > c. A given rm
i could deviate protably by lowering its list price to l   ". The rm would then sell to all the
price takers. From Lemma 10, prots from bargainers would also rise, since there would then
be n = 1 rms with the lowest list price as opposed to n = N . Symmetric list prices l = c form
an equilibrium, since prots from price takers and bargainers are zero at li 
n
lj : j 6= i
o
= c.
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Claim 6 The critical discount factor that allows collusion to be subgame perfect y < 1  1=N ,
and so is strictly lower in the presence of bargainers.
Proof. Recall that we are looking for subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in which the rms
collude on a price z at the list-price-setting stage and the discount stage, supported by the
threat of reversion to the lowest-payo non-collusive symmetric equilibrium. In the benchmark
case with only price takers, it is well-known that such collusion can be sustained by the threat
of reversion to the zero-prot one-shot equilibrium when the discount factor   1  1=N .
Lemma 10 with n = 1 gives prots in the unique non-collusive symmetric equilibrium in the
discount stage during a period in which a deviation from z > c occurred at the list-price-setting
stage. By Lemma 11, the lowest-payo non-collusive symmetric equilibrium of the one-shot
two-stage game must give prots of zero in the periods after a deviation occurred. Deviating
at the list-price-setting stage to li = z   " wins all the price takers. Using Lemmas 10 and 11,
total prot from this deviation is given by
dev1 '  (z   c) + (1  ) (z   c) (1  )N 1 = (z   c)
h
+ (1  ) (1  )N 1
i
. (37)
An alternative deviation would be to deviate at the discount stage to pi = z   ", instead of
deviating at the list-price-setting stage. The deviant rm would capture all the bargainers
whenever its price oer was received and 1=N of the bargainers otherwise. Thus, total prot
from this deviation (including prot at the list price-setting-stage preceding the deviation) is
given by
dev2 ' 

z   c
N

+ (1  )

 (z   c) + (1  )

z   c
N

=

z   c
N

[1 + (1  ) (N   1)] :
(38)
Hence the collusion can be sustained at all discount factors   y, where
z   c
N (1  y) =

z   c
N

max
n
N
h
+ (1  ) (1  )N 1
i
; 1 + (1  ) (N   1)
o
, i.e.,
y = 1  1
max
n
N
h
+ (1  ) (1  )N 1
i
; 1 + (1  ) (N   1)
o . (39)
Clearly, y < 1  1=N; since
max
n
N
h
+ (1  ) (1  )N 1
i
; 1 + (1  ) (N   1)
o
< N
given  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; 1).
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Proof of Proposition 12. Deviating at the list-price-setting stage gives dev1 given in (37).
Deviating at the discount stage gives dev2 given in (38). From (37), (38) and (39), the critical
discount factor that allows collusion to be subgame perfect is
y = 1  z   c
N maxfdev1; dev2g : (40)
We can see that:
@dev1
@
= (z   c) 1  (1  )N 1 > 0;
@dev2
@
=

z   c
N

[  (N   1)] < 0:
Thus, dev1 increases linearly in  while dev2 decreases linearly. Furthermore, when  = 1;
from (37) and (38) dev1 > dev2; and so dev1 ? dev2 ,  ? b, with b < 1 or equivalently
1   b > 0. Note that when  = 0 and  = 1; dev1 < dev2, and when  = 0 and  = 0;
dev1 > dev2; thus, b > 0 for  close to but smaller than 1, and b < 0 for  close to but larger
than 0.
If b > 0 or equivalently 1  b < 1, then when  < b or equivalently 1  > 1  b, using (40)
y = 1  (z   c) =  Ndev2. Thus, y increases in dev2; which in turn decreases in ; and hence
y increases in the proportion of bargainers 1   . When  > b or equivalently 1    < 1   b,
y = 1   (z   c) =  Ndev1 : Thus, y increases in dev1; which in turn increases in ; hence y
decreases in the proportion of bargainers 1  .
Proof of Proposition 13. Deviating at the list-price-setting stage gives dev1 given in (37).
Deviating at the discount stage gives dev2 given in (38). The critical discount factor that allows
collusion to be subgame perfect is given by (40). We can see that:
@dev1
@
= (z   c) (1  ) (N   1) (1  )N 2 ( 1) < 0;
@dev2
@
=

z   c
N

[(1  ) (N   1)] > 0:
Thus, dev1 decreases in  while dev2 increases linearly. Furthermore, when  = 0; from (37)
and (38) dev1 > dev2; and so dev1 ? dev2 ,  7 b with b > 0: Note that when  = 1 and
 = 0, dev1 < dev2, and when  = 1 and  = 1, dev1 > dev2; thus, b < 1 for  close to but
larger than 0, and b > 1 for  close to but smaller than 1.
If b < 1, then when  > b ; using (40) y = 1   (z   c) =  Ndev2 : Thus, y increases in
dev2; which in turn increases in . When  < b; y = 1  (z   c) =  Ndev1 : Thus, y increases
in dev1; which in turn decreases in :
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Proof of Remark 2. Using (9), noting that 12 +
l p
2t 2 (0; 1) and 12   l p2t 2 (0; 1) (since the
equilibrium is interior from the proof of Claim 5), and taking as given the equilibrium prices at
a common level of ; each rm's prots are a linear function of their own discount reliability i:
 (i) = (constant) + (1  )i (1  )
24  l   p
2

+ (p  c)

l   p
2t

| {z }
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(i)
+ (1  )i
24  l   p
2

+ (l   c)

l   p
2t

| {z }
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(ii)
:
Note that
(i) =

l   p
2

p  (t+ c)
t

> 0
since l  p > 0 from (26) and (27) and p > t+ c from (17). Furthermore, (ii) > (i); since l > p:
Thus, @@i > 0: From (2) and (17), lim"1 l = lim"1 p = t+ c: Thus, lim"1
@
@i
= 0:
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